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9Chapter1
General introduction
10
Every child experiences fears and anxiety. At a young age these fears and anxieties 
tend to be more global and unspecified but as the child grows older they may become 
more specific, abstract and internalized (Kendall & Ronan, 1990). Since children 
need to be able to conceptualize the threat, which depends on their (socio)cognitive 
capabilities, anxiety symptoms follow a predictable course (Muris, Merckelbach, 
Meesters, & van den Brand, 2002; Vasey, 1993; Westenberg et al., 2004). While 
at a very young age children may fear loud noises and separation from caregivers, 
their anxiety becomes more complex at the preschool age, when they might fear 
animals, the dark and fantasy creatures. Most of these fears disappear during the 
primary school period. From age 8 up to adolescence, children can develop anxiety 
and worries about bodily injury, fitting in socially and their school performance. In 
adolescence and adulthood, social acceptance, achievement, physical harm and 
death are frequent anxiety themes (Lewis & Volkmar, 1990). From an evolutionary 
perspective, these types of fears are understandable and some are even adaptive: 
fear of losing the acceptance of your social group or being anxious when walking in 
the dark is likely to protect you from social exclusion and harm (Bowlby, 1973). Most 
of these feelings and cognitions are common and short-lived, which made child 
therapists in the mid-twentieth century conclude that childhood fear and anxiety 
will disappear of their own accord with age and should therefore not be given much 
attention (Cartwright-Hatton, McNicol, & Doubleday, 2006). However, the past two 
decades researchers have identified a substantial minority of children with such high 
and enduring anxiety levels that they meet the criteria for an anxiety disorder. In 
actual fact, anxiety disorders are one of the most prevalent psychological disorders 
in children, which, when left untreated, can last into adulthood (Biederman et al., 
2005; Roza, Hofstra, van der Ende, & Verhulst, 2003). Children with one or both 
parents coping with an anxiety disorder are yet more vulnerable. As this group has 
been shown to be even more at risk of developing anxiety symptoms (Beidel & 
Turner, 1997), it is vital that we take a closer look at the mechanisms involved in the 
transmission of anxiety within families.
The studies presented in this doctoral dissertation served this purpose. In this 
introduction chapter I will first discuss the most recent theories about vulnerability 
factors in the development of anxiety, primarily focusing on general factors related 
to the intergenerational transmission of anxiety. Next, I will reflect on models of 
cognitive processing in which biased cognitive information processing is considered 
as a perpetuating factor in persistent anxiety and possibly a causal factor in the 
development of anxiety disorders. And finally, I will consider the connection between 
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child cognitive biases and the intergenerational transmission of anxiety. The chapter 
concludes with an outline of the studies performed.
1. Transmission of anxiety
Genetic influences
The high prevalence of persistent fears and anxiety disorders in children has raised 
questions about the factors that influence their development. A recent review 
reported that the heritability of anxiety disorders is between 30-50% (Shimada‐
Sugimoto, Otowa, & Hettema, 2015). Children of anxious parents have a significantly 
greater risk of developing an anxiety disorder and a major depressive episode than 
children of non-psychiatric controls, with the risk being still higher when they are 
compared to children of parents with other psychiatric disorders (Micco et al., 2009). 
This clearly indicates that anxiety is transferred from parent to child to a substantial 
degree. Family studies have shown that the risk is specific: the likelihood that people 
with social phobia, panic disorder or obsessive-compulsive disorder have relatives 
that suffer from the same disorders is high, while this is not the case for other anxiety 
disorders. Remarkably, rather than being specific, twin studies found the heritability 
for anxiety disorders to be more generalized (Carter, Pollock, Suvak, & Pauls, 2004; 
Coelho, Cooper, & Murray, 2007; Fyer, Lipsitz, Mannuzza, Aronowitz, & Chapman, 
2005; Low, Cui, & Merikangas, 2008; Mendlewicz, Papadimitriou, & Wilmotte, 1993). 
Although research aimed at identifying genes that might be related to anxiety has 
not yielded any conclusive results as yet, it has found indications of a general genetic 
influence across anxiety and related disorders (Gregory & Eley, 2007; Shimada–
Sugimoto et al., 2015). More recent studies focus on the complex interplay between 
gene and environment (GXE) and epigenetics (Shimada–Sugimoto et al., 2015). 
GXE interactions indicate that different genotypes respond differently to variations 
in environmental variables, while epigenetic effects imply that environmental factors 
affect gene expression without the DNA sequence being altered. In sum, as it has 
proven to be difficult to find obvious genetic risk factors, anxiety research is now 
taking a broader perspective, exploring both environmental and family factors that 
might be involved in the transmission of anxiety disorders.
Environmental influences
Parental influences and environmental risk factors have been widely studied in 
relation to anxiety transmission. Surprisingly, most family demographic variables do 
not show strong associations with the development of anxiety disorders, with the 
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exception of a family’s socio-economic status, which has been found to be related 
to generalized anxiety disorder (Rapee, 2012). As to the parental relationship, 
interparental violence and conflict, and separation (e.g. divorce) have been found 
to be relevant factors (for instance divorce; Rapee, 2012) in that they heighten 
anxiety in the short term (state anxiety). Whether these circumstances also lead to 
persistently elevated anxiety levels in the longer term (trait anxiety) is not yet clear 
(Jekielek, 1998; Lansford et al., 2006). 
To determine in what way anxious parents may influence their children, parental 
behaviour and parenting styles, and more specifically parental anxiety-related 
behaviour, have also been studied extensively. Children’s attitudes can be shaped by 
vicarious learning or modelling. In the anxiety context this means that by observing 
how their parents respond to a stimulus, they learn whether something is riskful 
or dangerous and thus to be feared and avoided, or not. Numerous studies have 
shown that clinically anxious children can indeed develop their symptoms through 
vicarious fear learning (Muris, Steerneman, Merckelbach, & Meesters, 1996; Öst, 
1985). In their experimental study, (Burstein & Ginsburg, 2010), for instance, showed 
that when mothers modelled fear about an upcoming test, anxiety in the children 
increased, as did their desire to avoid the test. Similarly, Lebowitz, Shic, Campbell, 
MacLeod, and Silverman (2015) found that children of anxious mothers only 
displayed an elevated fear of spiders if their mothers showed avoidant behaviour. 
Avoidance is not the only behaviour children can imitate. Especially infants learn by 
social referencing, i.e. they infer the relative danger of things from the emotional 
expression and reaction of others. Thus, infants tend to reflect their mother’s anxious 
reactions to a novel object (Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera, 1996; Parritz, Mangelsdorf, 
& Gunnar, 1992), where a single fearful reaction of the mother can already induce 
fear and avoidance in her toddler irrespective of whether the stimulus is fear-
relevant (e.g. a rubber spider) or fear-irrelevant (e.g. a rubber flower; Dubi, Rapee, 
Emerton, & Schniering, 2008). Some studies concluded that the parent’s reaction 
interacted with the child’s temperament. Confronting infants and their parents with 
and without anxiety disorders to two novel situations, Aktar, Majdandžić, de Vente, 
and Bögels (2013), for example, found that the infants with moderate-to-high levels 
of behavioural inhibition showed more avoidance when parents expressed their 
anxiety. Infant fear was only related to infant behavioural inhibition and not to the 
level of parental anxiety. Adults coping with an anxiety disorder also show more 
complex (safety) behaviours expressing as worrying, checking, compulsive urges or 
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a need for reassurance (APA, DSM-IV). The impact of these parental behaviours on 
children has not yet been tested extensively but it is conceivable that they will also 
heighten a child’s alertness.
Apart from their facial expressions, body language and behaviours with which 
parents can influence the attitudes and behaviours of their offspring, parents with 
an anxiety disorder may also (unknowingly) adopt an anxious parenting style. It is 
plausible that when anxious parents perceive a threat, they will also perceive it to 
be a threat to their children, which fear they will either knowingly or unknowingly 
convey. Muris, van Zwol, Huijding, and Mayer (2010) accordingly observed that 
parents who were given negative information about an animal told their children 
more threatening stories about it than the parents who had been given positive 
information. Even more interestingly, having been given ambiguous information, 
parents with relatively high anxiety levels told more negative stories, eliciting 
higher fear levels in their children than parents with lower anxiety levels. Similarly, 
Lester, Field, Oliver, and Cartwright-Hatton (2009) found that trait-anxious parents 
gave negative interpretations to ambiguous scenarios in which their child or they 
themselves were implicated. 
Parental beliefs influence the beliefs of their children then, with the direction 
depending on how the parent resolves an ambiguous situation. This is also supported 
by findings that parent and child threat-related cognitions are often associated 
(Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Creswell, O’Connor, & Brewin, 2006). Also, 
parental over-involvement may engender a sense of threat in the child, limiting its 
sense of competence which, in turn, can raise its feelings of anxiety (for a review, see 
Wood, McLeod, Sigman, Hwang, & Chu, 2003). Evidence for the specificity of these 
behaviours was provided by Murray, Cooper, Creswell, Schofield, and Sack (2007). 
They found that mothers with social phobia encouraged their child less to interact 
with a stranger than mothers suffering from generalized anxiety disorder did. 
Another study of this group showed that when children expressed more anxiety in a 
challenging task, anxious mothers were more intrusive and more anxious than non-
anxious mothers, reducing the quality of the mother-child relationship (Creswell, 
Apetroaia, Murray, & Cooper, 2013).  
In sum, there are multiple pathways by which parental and environmental factors 
can influence the transmission of anxiety. Important factors are the parents’ own 
fear behaviours, manifesting in facial expressions and avoidance behaviours, and 
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anxious/fearful parenting, as expressed in parental over-involvement and a threat- 
or fear-conveying communication style. 
2. Threat-related schemas
It is clear that having an inherited sensitivity for anxiety and witnessing anxiety 
behaviours in their parents puts children of parents with an anxiety disorder at a 
greater risk of becoming anxious children or adults themselves (Beidel & Turner, 
1997). Still, there is an important difference between state anxiety, when the child 
is anxious for short periods of time in response to specific situations, a heightened 
trait anxiety, when it is anxious across situations, and an anxiety disorder, which 
will affect the child in its daily life (Gidron, 2013). Cognitive theories posit that the 
difference lies in the strength of the negative threat-related schemas that children 
with anxiety symptoms have developed over time (Beck & Haigh, 2014), i.e. 
frameworks of associations that encompass learning experiences, thoughts, feelings 
and emotions. When everyday stimulus situations need to be processed, schemas 
help to provide meaning to internal and external events (Beck, 1976; Beck & Haigh, 
2014). They typically foster cognitive processing and tap into motivational, affective 
and physiological systems. Some schemas are associated with threat, for example 
when a child learns that spiders can be dangerous. This spider-threat association 
is clearly adaptive in certain situations but if the child learns that all spiders are 
dangerous, the schema is maladaptive. In the latter instance, the association 
increases the probability that the child will develop trait anxiety and eventually even 
a clinical anxiety disorder. Although unpleasant, trait anxiety will not severely disrupt 
the child’s daily life but this is different when it progresses into an anxiety disorder. 
The child develops schemas that are consistently overly associated with danger, 
threat or harm, which elicit an excessive anxiety response and avoidance of non-
threatening or ambiguous stimuli (APA, 2000; Puliafico & Kendall, 2006). Specific or 
generalized, the schemas now constitute a serious impairment to the child’s daily 
life.
When confronted with a potential threat, it is important that you make a quick 
assessment whether this threat is dangerous or not. After the first startle response, 
you need to evaluate if the thing you saw from the corner of your eye really is a 
dangerous burglar or just your aunt’s garden gnome, which is probably not that 
dangerous. According to Beck and Clark, 1997, these two mechanisms reflect the 
distinction between automatic and controlled fear-related cognitive processes, 
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where automatic processing is seen as fast and non-specific and is distinguished from 
slower, more consciously controlled processing. Following their theory, schemas 
fuel both the automatic and the controlled process and help one determine which 
stimuli should be regarded as potentially harmful. With healthy schemas, children 
can put their initial fear reaction into perspective and decide whether the perceived 
threat was indeed dangerous. However, when schemas are strongly biased towards 
threat, the automatic system responds too strongly to unthreatening stimuli and 
the controlled system is not properly activated or biased. Especially in situations 
without feedback about whether or not the expected threat has become reality, 
negative threat-related cognitions can develop or remain unchallenged (Hofmann, 
2007).
In sum, cognitive schemas generally are very adaptive representations of stimuli, 
ideas or experiences. However, when schemas are overly associated with threat, 
they become maladaptive. When information processing is fuelled by such anxious 
schemas, this not only leads to a threat-focused bias in the initial automatic reaction 
to a non-dangerous stimulus but also in the controlled cognitive evaluation, which 
then does not rectify the initial maladaptive response. Depending on the strength 
and absoluteness of this negative threat-related schema, it can develop into trait 
anxiety and, ultimately, into an anxiety disorder.
3. Biased information processing 
Integrating the automatic and controlled processes, several information-processing 
theories describe how processing of information can influence the development 
and maintenance of anxiety (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). The 
information-processing model proposed by Daleiden and Vasey (1997) is one of 
the leading models on childhood anxiety. They describe six stages of information 
processing: the encoding stage, the interpretation stage, the goal clarification or 
selection stage, the response access stage, the response selection stage and the 
enactment stage. All these steps differ in the extent to which they are automatically 
or more consciously processed. Muris and Field (2008) added the influences of 
biases in attention, interpretation and memory to the encoding and interpretation 
stage of this model, which was recently further extended by Klein (2016; see Figure 
1). 
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Figure 1. The Information-processing model of childhood anxiety describing the role of biased cognitive processes in 
the processing of threat-related information developed by Klein (p 202, 2016).
Note. Copyright © 2016 (A.M. Klein).
According to these models, stimulus information is processed as follows: a child 
perceives numerous stimuli at the same time; some of these stimuli can be ignored, 
others require an appropriate response. In Klein’s model, this process is represented 
by a filter that sifts the relevant stimuli. To know which stimuli are worth attending 
to, a child quickly scans the situation and encodes which stimuli are relevant. When 
it spots a threatening element or situation, the child will direct its attention to this 
perceived threat, making it feel anxious, especially when, after the interpretation 
stage, it concludes that the threat indeed is dangerous. Elements and circumstances 
that it regards as threatening will be stored in memory. Typically a healthy and 
necessary process, it becomes maladaptive when ambiguous or safe situations 
are associated with threat. Here, the child will pay inordinate attention to threat-
related stimuli that are actually irrelevant (attentional bias), interpreting them in an 
unrealistically negative manner (interpretation bias). Given that negative situations 
or outcomes are remembered better than positive ones (memory bias), the child’s 
feelings of threat and anxiety are raised, which in turn will prompt more biased 
processing, thereby perpetuating or even exacerbating the already too prominent 
anxiety symptoms. 
17
Content-specificity of biases
Cognitive theories hold cognitive biases to be content-specific in that anxious 
individuals will only display biased processing for stimuli that relate to their specific 
threat-related schemas (e.g. (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Schniering & 
Rapee, 2004). Children with a panic disorder, for instance, are expected to only 
show cognitive biases for panic-related stimuli and not for other threat-associated 
stimuli like spiders or social situations. Children with an anxiety disorder have been 
found to process more information in a negative way but results are mixed about 
whether this processing style is content-specific (Hadwin & Field, 2010b). In the 
next sections, I will discuss the state of the art in the research of cognitive biases in 
anxious children and the evidence for their content-specificity. 
Threat-related associations
When children associate ambiguous or non-threatening stimuli with threat, they 
show indices of biased schemas (e.g. Teachman, 2005). Even though it is a core 
process in the cognitive theories, relatively little research has considered these 
maladaptive associations in children. One way to assess the more automatic part 
of these fear- or threat-related associations is with reaction-time paradigms, such 
as the Affective Priming Task (APT; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), 
the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003a) and the Implicit 
Association Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Studies in adults 
demonstrated that threat-focused automatic associations are characteristic of highly 
fearful individuals with a variety of anxiety-related problems (Huijding, Wiers, & 
Field, 2010), where the associations partially predict uncontrollable fear responses 
(Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). The first study conducted in children did not find such 
evidence (Spence, Lipp, Liberman, & March, 2006). A second study found that 
threat-related spider associations specifically predicted spider-related avoidance 
behaviour independently of other anxiety measurements (Klein et al., 2012). It is 
obvious that, given its prominent role in cognitive processing, more studies into 
(mal)adaptive threat-related associations are needed (Huijding et al., 2010).
Attentional biases
According to the latest theories, attentional biases in anxious children are 
characterized by a pattern of initial vigilance for threat cues, followed by a sustained 
avoidance of threat processing in order to reduce anxiety (Mogg, Bradley, De Bono, 
& Painter, 1997; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987). The models suggest that all 
children and adolescents direct their attention towards stimuli that they perceive 
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to have a high threat value, but that the threshold is lower for high anxious youths, 
who will also show a greater proclivity to direct attentional resources to moderately 
threatening stimuli. Most of the studies in children used the Emotional Stroop Task 
and the Dot Probe Task (see Van Bockstaele et al., 2014, for a review of these tasks) 
and more recently also eye-tracking tasks (Gamble & Rapee, 2009) and observed 
elevated vigilance towards and avoidance of threat in anxious youths (Dalgleish, 
Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 2001; Monk et al., 2006; Puliafico & Kendall, 
2006; Stirling, Eley, & Clark, 2006; Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & Brown, 1995; Vasey, 
El–Hag, & Daleiden, 1996; Watts & Weems, 2006). A meta-analysis indicated 
that anxious children and adults have similar threat-related biases and that such 
tendencies are not observed in non-anxious individuals (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007). This supports the finding that 
attention biases in anxious children are content-specific (e.g. Dalgleish et al., 2003), 
i.e. the biases are not activated by random threat cues but only by those that trigger 
the child’s existing threat-related schemas.
Interpretation biases
There is evidence to suggest that anxious children show a greater tendency to 
interpret ambiguous situations in a threatening way than non-anxious age peers 
do, while there also is some support for its content-specificity (Bögels, Snieder, 
& Kindt, 2003; Hadwin, Garner, & Perez-Olivas, 2006; Huijding et al., 2010). Most 
researchers studying manifestations of this interpretation bias presented the children 
with ambiguous scenarios, asking them to indicate whether they think something 
threatening has happened. To measure the more automatic part of interpretation 
biases, other tasks have been used, such as homophone tasks (two words that 
sound the same but have different meanings; e.g Klein, Bakens, et al., 2016) and 
facial-expression tasks (e.g. Creswell et al., 2008).
Memory bias
Memory bias refers to the predisposition of anxious children to selectively recall 
negative information related to themselves or past situations. While the evidence 
of a memory bias in depressed children and adolescents (e.g. Bishop et al., 2002) 
is unequivocal, the evidence for a memory bias in anxious children is scarce and 
inconsistent (Daleiden, 1998; Klein et al., 2014; Moradi, Taghavi, Neshat-Doost, 
Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000; Watts & Weems, 2006). For instance, there is only one 
study that investigated the content-specificity of memory biases in children with 
PTSD (Moradi et al., 2000), with the authors reporting a general bias towards the 
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recollection of negative information. However, the study reported no evidence for a 
specific link between the anxiety disorder and the memory biases observed. 
Relationship between biases and behaviour
Most of the studies that explored cognitive biases in children used a single 
task, while the few studies that investigated associations among the biases they 
observed yielded mixed results, with some studies finding correlations and others 
not (Broeren, Muris, Bouwmeester, Field, & Voerman, 2011; Brown et al., 2014; 
Richards, French, Nash, Hadwin, & Donnelly, 2007; Watts & Weems, 2006). 
Even though they do not always appear to correlate with each other (Egloff & 
Schmukle, 2002; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Huijding & de 
Jong, 2005; Teachman & Woody, 2003), there is evidence that cognitive bias measures 
can independently predict behaviour in adults, supplementing the more direct 
measures of anxiety (e.g. self-reports). To date, there are only a handful of studies 
aimed at predicting anxiety and anxiety-related behaviour in children. Focused on 
spider fear and assessing the predominantly controlled processes with self-reports 
and the predominantly automatic processes with cognitive bias measures, Klein 
and colleagues (Klein, Becker, & Rinck, 2011a, 2011b; Klein et al., 2012) found that 
besides self-reports, threat-related associations, interpretation bias, attention bias 
and memory bias uniquely predict spider-related avoidance behaviour, where the 
biases appeared to be content-specific. Potential interrelationships of these biases 
have not yet been researched. 
Overall, there is evidence confirming the existence of cognitive biases in anxious 
children and in children with an anxiety disorder. Yet, not all biases have been 
researched extensively and still little is known about the relationships among the 
different bias measures. Also, research into the added value of cognitive bias 
measures to supplement more direct measures like self-reports is needed. 
4. Transmission of cognitive biases and anxiety
Biased cognitive processes have a clear role in the development and maintenance 
of anxiety disorders in children, but do they also have a role in the transmission of 
anxiety from parent to child? It is highly probable that the combination of genetic 
vulnerability, parental influences, temperament and life events creates a sensitivity 
for threat-focused learning. Accordingly, a behaviourally inhibited or shy child whose 
mother is coping with a social anxiety disorder may learn to relate strangers to threat 
20
having repeatedly seen mother avoiding eye contact with strangers. Once such 
perceptions and experiences have been linked to threat and stored in memory, the 
chance that it will also categorize similar situations in the future as being threatening 
increases, thereby reinforcing the child’s biased cognitive processing. However, 
whether parental cognitive biases also play a role in the transmission of anxiety 
is still subject to debate. Studies on the intergenerational transmission of biases 
have mostly focused on interpretation biases (Affrunti & Ginsburg, 2012; Creswell 
et al., 2013; Creswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005; Lester et al., 2009; Lester, Seal, 
Nightingale, & Field, 2010; Micco & Ehrenreich, 2008; Ooi, Dodd, & Walsh, 2015; 
Orchard, Cooper, & Creswell, 2015; Wheatcroft & Creswell, 2007). In general, these 
studies show that the parents’ self-reported fear levels and interpretation biases are 
associated with their children’s interpretation biases (Bögels, van Dongen, & Muris, 
2003; Creswell & O’Connor, 2006; Creswell et al., 2005). Furthermore, Lester et al. 
(2010) found that children who made threat interpretations also thought that their 
mother would disambiguate scenarios in a threatening way. Investigating a group of 
non-anxious and anxious mothers and their children, Orchard et al. (2015) observed 
that the mothers with an anxiety disorder had stronger negative expectations of 
their child’s coping behaviours, where negative interpretations about the mothers’ 
self-referent situations mediated the relationship. 
The above-mentioned studies all indicate that parental anxiety and child inter-
pretation biases are related. Unfortunately, the majority included either community 
samples or samples of clinically anxious children, which is not informative about 
how specific parental diagnoses relate to the child’s cognitive biases. Also, most 
studies assessed general anxiety and cognitive biases or did not specify the study 
populations, which does not inform about the content-specificity of the cognitive 
biases. We thus have very little knowledge about whether children of parents with 
an anxiety disorder display biases that are consistent with the specific nature of their 
parents’ anxiety disorder. In other words, do children of parents with a panic disorder, 
for instance, only display cognitive biases for panic-related situations? There is one 
cross-sectional study that investigated interpretation biases in children of parents 
with panic disorder and specific phobia (Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin, & Margraf, 
2002), finding evidence for the presence of an interpretation bias in children of 
parents with a panic disorder, although the effect was only obtained using a priming 
procedure. Two studies gauging attentional biases in children of parents with a 
panic disorder report contradicting findings, with Schneider, Unnewehr, In-Albon, 
and Margraf (2008) finding no evidence of an attentional bias as measured with 
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the Stroop Task. Using a visual-probe task, Mogg, Wilson, Hayward, Cunning, and 
Bradley (2012) do document that daughters of mothers with a lifetime panic disorder 
displayed an attentional bias for physical-health threat cues, which was associated 
with increased physical-health threat worries. However, as they only presented 
neutral and physical-health threat cues, it is not possible to draw any conclusions 
about the content-specificity of the attentional bias they observed. Again, to learn 
more about the intergenerational transmission of cognitive biases, there is a clear 
need for a focus on the content-specificity of these biases. 
5. Research goals
Recapping, we can conclude that childhood anxiety is a risk factor for the 
development of anxiety disorders and other psychopathology, which can last into 
adulthood. There are multiple pathways by which parental and environmental 
factors influence the transmission of anxiety, one of which is biased cognitive 
processing. There is evidence to suggest the existence of maladaptive cognitive 
biases in anxious children and in children with an anxiety disorder. However, not 
all biases have been researched extensively and very few studies have explored 
potential relationships between different biases and behaviours, while we still do 
not know whether such cognitive biases are more prevalent in the high-risk group of 
children of parents with an anxiety disorder and whether these are content-specific 
or not. The goal of the research presented in this doctoral dissertation accordingly 
was to investigate biased cognitive processing in children more closely also within 
the broader perspective of intergenerational transmission of anxiety. 
Associations among biased cognitive processing, anxiety and behaviour
Our first research goal was to explore both the automatic and (more) controlled 
mechanisms of biased cognitive processing in depth and to determine the 
predictive value of these biases for child anxiety and anxiety-related behaviour. The 
more controlled cognitive processes are studied by investigating the relationship 
between threat-related cognitions and anxiety in children. To gain more insight into 
the extent to which automatic response processes differ from the more controlled 
interpretation processes and to add to our understanding of the development 
of associated anxiety-focused behaviours, we combined cognitive bias measures 
that vary in the degree to which they tap into automatic and controlled systems. 
This enabled us to determine the measures’ predictive value for anxiety-related 
behaviour and compare this to the predictive power of self-reported anxiety and 
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behaviours.  
The role of cognitive biases in the intergenerational transmission of anxiety
In order to investigate the role of cognitive biases in children of parents with a panic 
disorder and/or social anxiety disorder, the second research goal of our research 
group, we started the SPRING project, which stands for Social anxiety and Panic 
Research, Impact on the Next Generation. This longitudinal project investigates the 
impact of child biased cognitive processing on future anxiety disorder development. 
The two cross-sectional studies into the associations between the content-specificity 
of child cognitive biases and child and parental anxiety that I performed within the 
context of this project will be presented in this thesis. With these studies I sought 
to determine whether biased information processing can constitute a vulnerability 
factor for children whose parents are dealing with an anxiety disorder. 
Outline of the dissertation
The two main aims of the studies presented in this dissertation were to investigate 
the mechanisms, manifestations and impact of biased cognitive processing in 
children and the nature and role of intergenerational transmission of childhood 
anxiety. Seeking to gain more insight into the relationships between children’s 
biased cognitive processing, their anxiety levels and fear-related behaviour, the 
focus of the studies described in Chapters 2 and 3 is on disentangling the automatic 
and controlled processes underlying the threat-related schemas that children have 
developed and identifying associations between these maladaptive cognitive 
patterns and their anxiety and behaviour. In the studies described in Chapters 4 
and 5 we look into the intergenerational transmission of biased cognitive processing 
as a vulnerability factor for children of parents with an anxiety disorder, where we 
investigate the relationship between parental and child anxiety by means of two 
different cognitive bias tasks.
Chapter 2 addresses children’s negative thoughts about their own social performance 
and the negative reactions of others. In the study described, I investigate the role 
these negative thought processes play in the development of childhood anxiety in 
children with varying levels of social anxiety using an adapted version of the social 
speech task to elicit negative thoughts and feelings of social anxiety (Dodd et al., 
2011) and a subscale of the Children’s Automatic Thoughts Scale (CATS; Schniering 
& Rapee, 2002) to assess the children’s social threat thoughts. The first goal of 
this study was to investigate whether negative thoughts about children’s own social 
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performance and about the negative reactions of others relate to social anxiety and 
anxiety after the speech task. The second goal was to test whether social anxiety 
relates to worse social skills or whether children with social anxiety underestimate 
their own social skills.
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between fear or threat-related associations, 
attentional bias, interpretation bias and memory bias in order to find out whether 
such biases can predict anxiety-focused behaviours in children with varying levels of 
spider fear and thus supplement predictions based on self-reports. Threat-related 
associations are assessed with the Affective Priming Task (APT; De Houwer, 2003b), 
attentional biases with a pictorial version of the Emotional Stroop Task (EST; Klein 
et al., 2011b; Klein et al., 2012) and memory bias with a free-recall task directly 
following the EST. Interpretation biases are gauged using an interpretation task 
in which children are asked to estimate the size of a live spider and the distance 
between them and the spider’s cage (Vasey et al., 2012). Besides replicating earlier 
studies and testing the spider interpretation task, we wished to determine how 
biases relate to each other and whether they can independently predict fear-related 
avoidance behaviour in children with varying degrees of spider phobia.
Chapter 4 describes a study that investigates whether interpretation bias should be 
seen as a vulnerability factor for the intergenerational transmission of anxiety within 
the context of the SPRING project. Children of parents with a panic disorder and/or 
social anxiety disorder are compared to age peers whose parents have no history 
of anxiety disorders. Resembling the paradigm used by Schneider et al. (2002), 
the children completed an Ambiguous Scenario Task with a priming condition to 
assess the presence and strength of interpretation biases in social-anxiety-relevant 
and panic-relevant scenarios, in the anticipation that children of parents with an 
anxiety disorder would display stronger interpretation biases than children of typical 
parents. Additionally, we examined whether there is a relationship between the 
child’s and its parent’s interpretation biases and the severity of panic/social anxiety 
symptoms and, if so, in which direction, and whether this relationship is content-
specific. 
Chapter 5 describes the first ever study to investigate whether threat-related 
associations constitute a vulnerability factor for children of parents with an anxiety 
disorder, again as part of the SPRING project. The sample consisted of the children 
that also participated in the study presented in Chapter 4. The questions I sought 
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to answer were whether the children of parents with an anxiety disorder would 
display stronger negative threat-oriented associations than the children of non-
affected parents and to test whether there is a relationship between their threat 
associations and the level of panic/social anxiety symptoms of the parent and/or 
child and whether this relationship is content-specific.
In Chapter 6 the main findings of the studies described in Chapters 2-5 are 
summarized and integrated, general limitations are discussed and some directions 
for further research presented.
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Chapter2
The Role of Cognitive Factors in Childhood 
Social Anxiety: Social Threat Thoughts and 
Social Skills Perception
Based on: van Niekerk, R. E., Klein, A. M., Allart-van Dam, E., Hudson, J. L., Rinck, 
M., Hutschemaekers, G. J. M., & Becker, E. S. (2017). The role of cognitive factors 
in childhood social anxiety: Social threat thoughts and social skills perception. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 41(3), 489-497.
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Abstract
Models of cognitive processing in anxiety disorders state that socially anxious 
children display several distorted cognitive processes that maintain their anxiety. 
The present study investigated the role of social threat thoughts and social skills 
perception in relation to childhood trait and state social anxiety. In total, 141 children 
varying in their levels of social anxiety performed a two-minute speech in front of 
a camera and filled out self-reports about their trait social anxiety, state anxiety, 
social skills perception and social threat thoughts. Results showed that social threat 
thoughts mediated the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety 
after the speech task, even when controlling for baseline state anxiety. Furthermore, 
we found that children with higher state anxiety and more social threat thoughts 
had a lower perception of their social skills, but did not display a social skills deficit. 
These results provide evidence for the applicability of the cognitive social anxiety 
model to children.
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Fear in social situations can be very impairing: Having to give a presentation at 
school, or being the centre of attention is a frightening experience for many children. 
A persistent strong fear of these types of situations has been recognized by 22% of 
the boys and 32% of the girls between the age of 14-24 (Wittchen, Stein, & Kessler, 
1999). When social anxiety generalizes, it has a significant impact on children’s 
functioning, influencing self-esteem, schooling, peer relationships, and their family 
environment (Essau, Conradt, & Petermann, 2000; Ginsburg, La Greca, & Silverman, 
1998). In addition, anxiety that starts in childhood often persists into adulthood 
when left untreated (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). Considering the grave 
impact on many life areas and the long-lasting effects of social anxiety, research 
about factors that underlie and maintain social anxiety in children is essential. 
Why do children become frightened in specific social situations like giving a 
presentation? It is to be expected that children who have a more anxious disposition 
are the ones who become more anxious in these situations, because theoretically 
“trait anxiety predicts state anxiety under conditions of psychological threat, 
especially conditions of evaluation” (p 209, Reiss, 1997). However, several studies 
showed that trait social anxiety alone only moderately predicts elevated anxiety 
during a speech. It is of interest to find more factors that may relate to state anxiety, 
for this will offer more insights into the mechanisms by which anxiety arises. These 
insights can be used for improving treatment interventions. 
Based on cognitive theories of the development of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), social threat cognitions might be 
important for predicting which children will become anxious during a social evaluative 
task such as giving a speech (Hodson, McManus, Clark, & Doll, 2008). According to 
the theory by Rapee and Heimberg (1997), socially anxious individuals are greatly 
concerned that they will be negatively evaluated and see others as inherently 
critical. They also tend to perceive themselves as less socially skilful (Alfano, Beidel, 
& Turner, 2006; Foa, Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996; Hofmann, 2004). Despite 
regular exposure to social situations, anxiety does not decrease, because socially 
anxious individuals are convinced that their negative beliefs are being confirmed 
(Clark, 2001). The expectancy of social threat, for example expecting to be bullied 
or to be rejected (Hofmann, 2007) and the anticipation of social mishaps is seen as a 
maintaining factor in social anxiety, because socially anxious individuals fear that the 
next social event will have a negative outcome as well. As a result, socially anxious 
individuals engage in avoidance and safety behaviour, preventing opportunities in 
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which the negative beliefs can be disconfirmed (Wells et al., 1995). 
The link between cognitive factors and state anxiety in children was investigated by 
Tuschen-Caffier, Kühl and Bender (2011), who focussed on negative self-evaluation 
in children with various levels of social anxiety. They found a relationship between 
trait anxiety, state anxiety and negative thoughts: The higher the trait anxiety, the 
higher the state anxiety during a speech task, and the more negative evaluative 
thoughts the children experienced. Unfortunately, Tuschen-Caffier and colleagues 
(2011) used a non-validated general measure of negative self-evaluation, consisting 
of four questions: “I can’t manage it”, “I’m excited”, “I feel insecure”, “I wonder what 
others watching me would think” (p. 235), which could possibly be too ambiguous as 
a measure of negative self-evaluation. Other studies have investigated social threat 
thoughts only by means of questionnaires (Rheingold, Herbert, & Franklin, 2003), or 
focused on threat interpretations in imaginary situations (Barrett et al., 1996; Bögels 
& Zigterman, 2000; Creswell et al., 2005; Muris, Luermans, Merckelbach, & Mayer, 
2000). How social threat thoughts relate to anxiety experienced by children in real 
life situations could not be answered by these studies. Neither do they answer the 
question if an increase in anxiety during a social evaluative task is stronger related to 
thoughts about social rejection (social threat thoughts) or thoughts about one’s own 
performance (social skills). Therefore, the first goal of this study was to investigate 
the relationship between social threat thoughts, perceived social skills, trait social 
anxiety and state anxiety during a social speech task. 
If children do indeed have social threat thoughts in social situations, do they also have 
an increased chance of being exposed to those threats? For instance, do they have 
less social skills and are they therefore at risk of being rejected? Despite evidence 
that socially anxious children report to have given an inferior performance, it is not 
clear if they in fact show social skill deficits, or if their self-evaluation is biased. Some 
studies support the hypothesis that socially anxious children and adolescents have 
a social skill deficit (Beidel, Turner, & Morris, 1999; Inderbitzen-Nolan, Anderson, 
& Johnson, 2007), while others find that socially anxious children underestimate 
their social skills, while not performing worse than non-anxious children (Cartwright-
Hatton, Tschernitz, & Gomersall, 2005; Morgan & Banerjee, 2006). Moreover, there 
are no published studies that examined the link between social threat thoughts and 
observed social skills, even though this could give more insight into the relation 
between threat cognitions and actual behaviour. Thus, the second goal of this study 
was to investigate if trait social anxiety, state anxiety and social threat thoughts 
39
relate to social skill deficits. 
To summarize, the goals of this study were twofold. First, we investigated whether 
social threat thoughts and social skills perception mediate the relationship between 
trait social anxiety and state anxiety following a social speech. Following the model 
of Hofmann (2007), we hypothesized that both more social threat thoughts and a 
more negative social skills perception will mediate a positive relationship between 
trait social anxiety and state anxiety. Our second goal was to test whether trait 
social anxiety is related to social skills deficits or an underestimation of social skills 
and if this relationship is mediated by social threat thoughts and change in state 
anxiety during a social speech task. Since it is unclear if socially anxious children 
underestimate their skills or in fact have less social skills, we could not formulate a 
specific hypothesis for this research question.
  
Methods
Participants
Participants were 141 children (40 boys) aged between 8 and 13 years (M = 10.1, SD 
= 1.12), varying in levels of social anxiety. Children were selected from 718 children 
participating in a large study about anxiety and avoidance behaviour involving 11 
different elementary schools. Due to time constraints, it was not possible to test all 
children more extensively, so a selection of 141 children was made. To increase the 
number of anxious children in the sample and achieve a more even distribution of 
social anxiety we selected children based on the Social Anxiety Scale for Children-
Revised (SASC-R; Ginsburg et al., 1998; La Greca & Stone, 1993), the social anxiety 
subscale of the Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED-71; 
Bodden, Bögels, & Muris, 2009) and the Behavioral Inhibition Questionnaire 
(BIQ; Broeren & Muris, 2010), such that levels of social anxiety were more evenly 
distributed and approximately the same number of girls and boys scored in the 
lower and higher regions of self-reported anxiety. Time between screening and 
individual testing for the current study was approximately 3 months. To obtain an 
indication of the severity of the trait social anxiety of our sample we calculated 
how many children scored above the clinical cut-off of 8 of the SCARED-71 social 
anxiety subscale. We found that 50 children (40%) scored above this clinical cut-off. 
The current sample partly overlapped with the samples in two studies to validate 
a measure of spider fear (Klein, van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & Becker, in press) 
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and a auditory interpretation task measure (Klein, Bakens, et al., 2016), a study on 
biases in spider fear (Klein, van Niekerk, ten Brink, et al., in press), and a study on 
the specificity of interpretation biases (Klein, Flokstra, et al., 2016).
Measures
Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED-71). The 
SCARED-71 measures symptoms of DSM-IV anxiety disorders, including separation 
anxiety, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, social phobia, specific phobia, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder and school phobia 
(Bodden et al., 2009). Due to time constraints, we only used the subscale social 
phobia in the current study. The SCARED-71 can be used to differentiate clinically 
anxious from non-anxious children on a total score and on all subscales and has 
a good internal consistency (Bodden et al., 2009). Children score how often they 
experience each anxiety symptom on a 3-point Likert scale (0 = almost never, 1 
= sometimes, 2 = often). Internal consistency of the social anxiety subscale used 
in the present study was good (Cronbach’s α = .88). Given that the items in the 
SCARED are phrased in a general or chronic way, they are considered to reflect 
a trait conceptualization of social anxiety (Muris, Rapee, Meesters, Schouten, & 
Geers, 2003). 
The Children’s Automatic Thoughts Scale (CATS). The CATS consists of 40 items 
that characterize different negative thoughts (e.g., “Kids are going to laugh at me”; 
(Schniering & Rapee, 2004). Social threat thoughts were measured with five items of 
the social threat scale of this questionnaire, supplied by Dodd et al. (2011) together 
with their social speech protocol: “I’m worried that I’m going to get teased; I’m 
going to look silly; People are thinking bad things about me; I look like an idiot; 
I’m afraid I will make a fool of myself”. The items are scored on a five-point scale 
from 0 (not at all) to 4 (all the time). The CATS has consistently shown good internal 
reliability, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .82 to .96 (Schniering & Lyneham, 
2007; Schniering & Rapee, 2002; Schniering & Rapee, 2004). Cronbach’s alpha of 
the subset of the social threat scale in this study was .78.
State anxiety. State anxiety was measured with 6 statements addressing different 
elements of anxiety. Children were asked to rate the following items on a scale 
from 0-10: anxious, excited, palpitations, funny feeling in stomach, sweating and 
shaking (based on: In-Albon, Dubi, Rapee, & Schneider, 2009). All items had two 
little drawings of a figure that depicted a neutral state on the left side (0) and the 
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specific feeling on the right side (e.g. a scared expression with the item ‘anxious’) 
(10).  Both measures of state anxiety, before and after the speech task, had good 
internal consistency (α = .87 and α = .88). 
Social speech task. The procedure of the speech task was similar to the protocol 
of the high anxiety condition used by Dodd et al. (2011). All children performed 
the task individually in a separate room at school, together with a trained research 
assistant. The children were told that the speech would be recorded on video 
and that adults would watch the videos. The children were allowed to talk about 
anything they wanted and the assistant gave a few examples of possible subjects. 
The child stood straight up, facing two cameras, one of which recorded the whole 
body, while the other one recorded the facial expression. The assistant sat behind 
the child, was not visible for the child, and did not react to the child’s utterances. 
When the child was silent for 10 seconds, the assistant gave a standardized prompt 
(e.g. “Could you tell something about your hobby?”). There was a maximum of 
three prompts, each given after ten seconds of silence. The researcher wrote down 
how many prompts were given. The assistant ended the task if the child had not 
spoken after the third prompt.
Video Ratings
The Performance Questionnaire. The PQ is a nine-item instrument that measures 
performance evaluation after a public speaking task (Cartwright-Hatton et al., 
2005). There are two versions: the PQ-C for the subjective experience of the child 
and the PQ-O for the observer. Items are scored on a four-point scale ranging from 
not very (much) to very (much). Following the procedure by Miers et al. (2009), the 
questionnaire was split up into two scales: a social skills scale and a nervousness scale. 
The internal consistency for the resulting two subscales of the PQ-C in the present 
study was adequate (Cronbach’s α = .71 for social skills and .61 for nervousness). 
Two trained observers (master-students) watched the videos of the speeches and 
rated the participants’ performance using this questionnaire. They were blind to the 
anxiety level of the children and worked independently of each other. Cronbach’s 
alpha calculation and a regression analysis were performed to analyse the interrater 
agreement over a subset of 20% of the cases. Cronbach’s alpha of the nervousness 
scale rated by the observers was not sufficient (Cronbach’s α = .34), therefore this 
scale was left out of the analysis. Cronbach’s alpha of the social skills scale was 
comparable with findings in previous research (α = .72). Regression analyses of the 
social skills scale showed that the observers did not systematically differ in their 
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scores, and that agreement was high (b = .917, t(22) = 9.40, p < .001). The ratings 
of the first observer were a good predictor of the variance of the ratings of the other 
observer, R2 = .794, F(1,24) = 88.43.
Procedure
For all participants, parental active consent was acquired in writing prior to the 
study. After establishing active verbal consent from the children as well, children 
were individually tested in a quiet room away from the main classroom. As part of 
the large study, the children participated in two sessions of one hour each. In the 
second session, the participants gave the 2-minute impromptu speech and filled 
out the questionnaires. Right before the social speech task instructions, the children 
filled out the first state anxiety measurement. Directly after having finished the 
speech task, the children were asked to fill out the state anxiety measure again, as 
well as the social threat questions and the rating of their own performance. Trained 
master students supervised the sessions.
Data Analysis
There were 5 children who did not fill out the social threat scale, and 12 children whose 
video of the social speech task was not usable for rating, and they were excluded 
from the data analyses. To investigate our research questions, two mediation analyses 
were performed with the use of the SPSS-add on PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). This 
program is preferable over the causal steps approach of Baron and Kenny (1986), 
for it is a more advanced method of quantifying the intervening variable models 
(Hayes, 2009). We used bootstrapping analysis with 5000 bootstrap resamples to 
generate estimates of indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Bootstrapping is a 
nonparametric resampling procedure that creates an approximation of the sampling 
distribution of a statistic from the available data. The procedure generates point 
estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effects and does not require 
assumptions about a normal sample distribution that underlie the Sobel test. In 
bootstrapping analysis, the test of an indirect effect (mediation) is if the value of 0 
is not between the lower and upper bound of the 95% bias corrected confidence 
intervals. 
Bootstrapping can also be useful when data is skewed, which was the case with the 
scores on the social threat thoughts scale. Several children did not experience social 
threat thoughts at all. Since bootstrapping does not require a normal distribution, 
it is one of the advised methods of analysing this type of data (Delucchi & Bostrom, 
2004). 
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For the second mediation analysis, two difference scores were used. Change in state 
anxiety was calculated by subtracting baseline state anxiety score from the post 
speech task state anxiety score. The difference between self-perception of social 
skills by the child and the ratings of social skills by the observers were calculated by 
subtracting the observer score from the child score. As a result, underestimation of 
social skills by the child was indicated by a negative score. 
Results
Table 1 presents mean scores and standard deviations for all questionnaires. First, we 
examined whether social threat thoughts and self-perceived social skills mediated 
the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety. To explore this first 
goal, we estimated a serial multiple mediator model with these two theoretically-
derived mediators (M1: social threat thoughts and M2: social skill child perception) 
using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). This enabled us to test the serial indirect effects of 
trait social anxiety on state anxiety scores via social threat thoughts and social skills 
perception (see Figure 1). Baseline state anxiety score was entered as a covariate. 
Results indicated that the total effect of trait social anxiety on post-state anxiety 
scores was significant (β = 0.21, t = 4.11, SE = .05, p < .001). As expected, we 
found that the indirect effect of trait social anxiety on state anxiety via social threat 
thoughts was statistically different from zero (β = .24, 95% CI = .10 to .40). The 
indirect effect of trait social anxiety on state anxiety via self-perceived social skills 
was not significant (β = .001, 95% CI = -.02 
to .05). Furthermore, the predicted model of 
the serial indirect effect of trait social anxiety 
on state anxiety via social threat thoughts and 
self-perceived social skills was not supported, 
as the indirect effect was not statistically 
different from zero (β = .003, 95% CI = -.02 
to .04). This means that social threat thoughts 
mediated the relationship between trait 
social anxiety and state anxiety, as well as 
the relationship between trait social anxiety 
and self-perceived social skills, even when 
controlling for baseline state anxiety. Contrary 
to our expectations, negative self-perceived 
social skills did not relate to a higher state 
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anxiety after the task. 
Note: Trait social anxiety (SCARED-soc); state anxiety (SA); social skills child 
perception (PQ-C Skills) and social skills observer perception (PQ-O Skills).
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Beta values for the relationship between trait social anxiety and state anxiety as mediated by social threat 
thoughts and social skills rating of the child, controlled for baseline state anxiety. The beta value of the direct effect 
between trait anxiety and state anxiety, controlling for the mediation effect, is in parentheses. 
* p < .05, ** p < .001.
Our second research goal was to test whether trait social anxiety is related to social 
deficits or an underestimation of skills and if this relationship is mediated by social 
threat thoughts and change in state anxiety on the social speech task. First, to 
investigate if trait anxiety is related to social skill deficits or an underestimation of 
skills, we calculated correlations to investigate whether children with higher trait 
social anxiety were rated lower by the observers on their social skills than low trait 
anxious children, or if these children underestimated their skills. As is shown in Table 
2, none of the anxiety-related measures correlated with the rating of social skills by 
the observer (trait social anxiety: r =.03, p = .76). However, trait social anxiety did 
correlate significantly with the difference score of the social skills rating (child rating 
minus observer rating), showing a negative relationship (r = -.18, p < .042), which 
indicates that children with higher trait anxiety rated their social skills lower than the 
observers. When looking at the slope of this relationship (y = 0.08-0.03*x), we found 
that children with a trait social anxiety score of 2.67 score or lower, scored higher 
or equal to the observers. When trait social anxiety was higher than 2.67, children 
underestimated their social skills compared to observers. Since the clinical cut-off 
for this subscale is 8, we found that children scoring under this cut-off score also had 
the tendency to slightly underestimate their social skills compared to the observers. 
These results indicate that trait socially anxious children do not demonstrate a social 
skills deficit, but underestimate their social skills. 
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Note: Trait social anxiety (SCARED-soc), state anxiety (SA); social skills child perception (PQ-C Skills) and social skills 
observer perception (PQ-O Skills).
* p < .05, ** p < .001
To further examine whether the relationship between trait social anxiety and social 
skills underestimation is mediated by social threat thoughts and change in state 
anxiety during the speech task, we performed a serial multiple mediation analysis 
with two mediators (M1:  social threat thoughts and M2: change in state anxiety; 
see Figure 2). Results showed that the total effect of trait social anxiety on the social 
skills difference score was significant (β = -0.18, t = -2.06, SE = .09, p < .042). The 
indirect effect of trait social anxiety on social skill difference score via social threat 
thoughts was not statistically different from zero (β = .07, 95% CI = -0.21 to 0.60). 
Also, the indirect effect of trait social anxiety on social skill difference score via state 
anxiety change score was not statistically different from zero (β = .004, 95% CI = 
-0.02 to 0.05). Finally, the predicted model of the serial indirect effect of trait social 
anxiety on social skills difference score via social threat thoughts and state anxiety 
change score was not supported, as the indirect effect was not statistically different 
from zero (β = .01, 95%CI = -0.05 to 0.7). These results demonstrate a relationship 
between trait social anxiety and social skills underestimation: the higher the trait 
social anxiety, the more children underestimated their social skills. This effect was 
not mediated by social threat thoughts or change in state anxiety.  
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Figure 2. Beta values for the relationship between trait social anxiety and difference score of social skill rating as 
mediated by social threat thoughts and change in state anxiety. The beta value of the direct effect between trait anxiety 
and the difference score of social skill rating, controlling for the mediation effect, is in parentheses. 
* p < .05, ** p < .001.
Discussion
The first goal of this study was to investigate whether social threat thoughts and 
social skills perception of the child mediated the relationship between trait social 
anxiety and state anxiety after a social speech. We found that social threat thoughts 
were related to lower self-perception of social skills. Furthermore, we found that 
social threat thoughts mediated the relationship between trait social anxiety and 
state anxiety after a speech task, even when controlling for baseline state anxiety. 
Self-perception of social skills did not mediate the relationship between trait and 
state anxiety. The second goal was to test whether trait social anxiety is related to a 
social skills deficit or to an underestimation of social skills, and if this relationship is 
mediated by social threat thoughts and change in state anxiety on the social speech 
task. We found that children with higher trait social anxiety tended to underestimate 
their performance, but they were not observed to have poorer social skills than 
children with lower trait social anxiety. Moreover, the relationship between trait 
social anxiety and underestimation of skills was not mediated by social threat 
thoughts or change in state anxiety. It is important however, to keep in mind that 
the two mediators were examined at the same time-point, meaning that it is not 
possible to derive any causal hypotheses from this model. 
The present study provides evidence that two important aspects of the most 
influential social anxiety theories are applicable to children (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). First, the current results support 
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that social threat thoughts are contributing to state anxiety in children in social 
evaluative situations. Second, social skills perception did not relate to change in 
state anxiety, which indicates that social threat thoughts are more relevant in the 
process of elevated state anxiety in trait socially anxious children than social skills 
perception. However, we did find that these two cognitive factors had a significant 
negative correlation; children who displayed more social threat thoughts perceived 
their social skills as being lower. This result is in line with other studies that show 
that socially anxious children have a specific negatively biased cognitive processing 
style (Ferreri, Lapp, & Peretti, 2011) and is a valuable addition to the already existing 
child literature about the importance of threat-based interpretations and threat 
responses as maintaining factor in anxiety disorders (Manassis, 2013). This finding 
also corresponds with adult studies that found that individuals with a social anxiety 
disorder form negative mental representations, which is based on how they think 
potential evaluators would view them (Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; Wells, 
Clark, & Ahmad, 1998). It would be worthwhile for further research to explore if the 
presence of social threat thoughts is a prognostic risk factor or maintaining factor for 
the development of social anxiety. 
With regard to the second research question, we did not find evidence for a social 
skill deficit; we only found a non-mediated relationship of trait social anxiety 
with an underestimation of social skills. We also found that children generally 
tended to underestimate their social skills compared to observers, although this 
underestimation increased with a higher trait social anxiety. These findings are 
consistent with cognitive theories of social anxiety, which assume that socially 
anxious people have the tendency to underestimate their skills, and overestimate 
risk of rejection (Clark, 2001; Hofmann, 2007). 
Some limitations of the current study should be mentioned. First, we exposed the 
children to a video camera and an experimenter, which is not representative of 
usual social situations. To increase the ecological validity of these findings, it may 
be better to test the children in a more realistic setting, such as in a classroom or 
during interaction with peers (Spence, Donovan, & Brechman-Toussaint, 1999), even 
though it should be noted that there might be more interfering factors in a realistic 
setting that cannot be easily measured and controlled. Second, we only measured 
social threat thoughts after the social speech task. It would be useful to measure 
these thoughts at more time points. Third, we only included children with varying 
levels of social anxiety, and the results might differ for children with a diagnosed 
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social anxiety disorder. It is possible that children with a social anxiety disorder are 
even more vigilant for threat, and therefore their social threat thoughts might be 
triggered by milder threats (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Future studies should include 
a clinically anxious group, before firm conclusions can be drawn. Furthermore, our 
study focussed on social anxiety only and it would be worthwhile to investigate 
if social treat thoughts are specific to social anxiety or if they arise in a variety of 
anxiety disorders. Finally, to gain more insight in the relation between social threat 
thoughts and the maintenance of social anxiety, it would be relevant to measure 
the relation between social threat thoughts and behaviour. For instance, does the 
presence of social threat thoughts predict automatic approach-avoidance behaviour 
(Heuer, Rinck, & Becker, 2007). If so, this would be in line with cognitive theories 
of social anxiety that state that social threat interpretations lead to avoidance 
behaviour (Hofmann, 2007). Some evidence for this hypothesis has been found in 
adults by Rachman, Grüter-Andrew, and Shafran (2000), who reported that post-
event rumination was related to anxiety during a social situation and avoidance of 
comparable situations in the future. 
Clinical Relevance
This study showed that an increase in anxiety during social situations could be partly 
explained by the presence of cognitions about being rejected by others. Challenging 
these social threat thoughts in children might be an important component in 
treatment, as evidence suggests that change of threat expectancies regarding the 
likelihood of aversive events could be the working mechanism in anxiety treatments, 
as opposed to habituation (Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & Vervliet, 2014). 
Thus, exposure to social situations without taking the social threat expectancies in 
account might even be counter-productive. Children will continue to feel rejected, 
even though there is no objective evidence that they are performing worse than 
other children. Since there are already treatment protocols for adults that focus 
on these expectancies and include (video) feedback to change these social threat 
thoughts (Hofmann & Otto, 2008), it is very relevant to study if this approach would 
also be beneficial for children.
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Chapter3
Biases in Attention, Interpretation, Memory, 
and Associations in Children with Varying 
Levels of Spider Fear: Inter-relations and 
Prediction of Behaviour
Based on: Klein, A. M., van Niekerk, R.E., ten Brink, G., Rapee, R. M., Hudson, J. L., 
Bögels, S. M., Becker, E.S., & Rinck, M. (2017). Biases in attention, interpretation, 
memory, and associations in children with varying levels of spider fear: Inter-
relations and prediction of behavior. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 54, 285-291.
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Abstract
Cognitive theories suggest that cognitive biases may be related and together 
influence the anxiety response. However, little is known about the interrelations of 
cognitive bias tasks and whether they allow for an improved prediction of fear-related 
behaviour in addition to self-reports. This study simultaneously addressed several 
types of cognitive biases in children, to investigate attention bias, interpretation bias, 
memory bias and threat-related associations, their interrelations and the prediction 
of behaviour. Eighty-one children varying in their levels of spider fear completed 
the Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C) and performed 
two Emotional Stroop tasks, a Free Recall task, an interpretation task including size 
and distance indication, an Affective Priming Task, and a Behavioural Assessment 
Test (BAT). We found an attention bias, interpretation bias, and threat-related 
associations, but no evidence for a memory bias. The biases showed little overlap. 
Attention bias, interpretation bias, and threat-related associations predicted unique 
variance in avoidance of spiders. Interpretation bias and threat-related associations 
remained significant predictors, even when self-reported fear was included as a 
predictor. This is the first study to find evidence that different cognitive biases each 
predict unique variance in avoidance behaviour. Furthermore, it is also the first 
study in which we found evidence for a relation between fear of spiders and size and 
distance indication. We showed that this bias is distinct from other cognitive biases.
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Cognitive theories of fear and anxiety emphasize the importance of cognitive 
processes in the onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders. According to these 
theories, fearful adults and children have anxiety-related associations and schemata 
that direct processing resources towards threat-relevant information, resulting in 
cognitive biases in attention, interpretation, and memory (e.g., Daleiden & Vasey, 
1997; Muris & Field, 2008; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; for a 
schema-based theory of childhood anxiety, see Kendall & Ronan, 1990). These fear- 
or threat-related associations, attention, interpretation and memory processes are 
believed to be related to each other (Williams et al., 1997), and some theoretical 
models suggest that they also influence each other in order to elicit an anxiety 
response (e.g., Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006; Muris & 
Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005). 
Research with fearful children has indeed provided evidence of biases in attention 
and interpretation in childhood anxiety, but the evidence for memory biases and 
threat-related associations in childhood anxiety is mixed (for an overview see, 
Hadwin & Field, 2010). Most studies report that children with higher levels of fear 
have the tendency to quickly focus attention on stimuli that are associated with fear 
and threat, and that they find it difficult to disengage attention from these stimuli 
(attention bias; for a meta-analysis see Bar-Heim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakersmans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). Studies regarding interpretation biases often 
find that fearful children interpret ambiguous situations more negatively than non-
fearful children (interpretation bias; Muris 2010). The findings concerning memory 
biases show a rather mixed picture; some studies find evidence that fearful children 
remember more negative stimuli than non-fearful children (e.g., Watts & Weems, 
2006), but other studies find no differences between fearful and non-fearful children 
(Dalgleish et al., 2013). Finally, there are only a few studies that have explored 
differences in associations between fearful and non-fearful children. Almost all 
studies found no evidence for the existence of threat-related associations (Huijding, 
Wiers, & Field, 2010). The only study that did find a difference between fearful-and 
non-fearful children unexpectedly found that fearful children showed fewer threat-
related associations (Klein et al., 2012). 
Even though there are many studies that have examined cognitive biases in children 
using different tasks, there are only few studies that addressed different biases 
simultaneously in children, and the evidence for significant overlap is rather weak and 
inconsistent (e.g., Broeren, Muris, Bouwmeester, Field & Voerman, 2011; Klein, et 
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al., 2012, 2014; Richards, French, Nash, Hadwin, & Donnellly, 2007; Weems, Costa, 
Watts, Taylor, & Cannon, 2007; Watts & Weems, 2006). Furthermore, none of these 
studies included attention, interpretation, memory and threat-related associations 
in a single trial. Finally, some of these studies found some evidence for the ability 
of the different cognitive biases to predict unique variance in fear, indicating that 
the different biases might measure separate aspects of fear (e.g., Klein et al., 2012, 
2014, 2016a; Watts & Weems, 2006). Several authors have expressed the need for 
more research on the relation between cognitive biases (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2006; 
Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005). Knowing more about how cognitive 
biases persist and interact with each other could have important implications for the 
identification, prevention, and treatment of anxiety in children. 
Therefore, the main goal of this study was to investigate attention, interpretation 
and memory biases and threat-related associations, their relation, and their ability 
to uniquely predict spider fear in a sample of children with varying levels of spider 
fear. We chose to study fear of spiders for several reasons. First, specific fears such 
as fear of spiders are highly prevalent in children (Strauss & Last, 1993). Second, 
normative fears such as fear of spiders are often used as a model for studying the 
development of other fears, because several studies suggest that the underlying 
processes of fear are similar (Williams et al., 1997). Third, unlike other fears and 
anxieties, there are good behavioural tasks designed to measure behaviour related 
to fear of spiders. Finally, we wanted this study to be comparable to the studies by 
Klein and colleagues (2011, 2012) for the purposes of replication. Both studies (Klein 
et al., 2011, 2012) explored attention bias in children with varying levels of spider 
fear, and Klein and colleagues (2012) also included an Affective Priming Task (APT) 
to study threat-related associations. Both studies found evidence for an attention 
bias, and Klein and colleagues (2012) also found differences between fearful and 
non-fearful children on the APT. Furthermore, the indirect measures used in both 
studies were able to explain unique variance in fear-related behaviour. 
Based on theoretical conceptualizations (Williams et al., 1997) and previous findings 
(for an overview, see Hadwin & Field, 2010), we hypothesized that children with 
high levels of spider fear on the self-report and behavioural measures would display 
biases in attention and interpretation. We had no definite hypothesis for either the 
relation between spider fear, memory bias and threat-related associations or the 
interrelations between the different measures, because of the few studies showing 
mixed results (see Hadwin & Field, 2010). However, we did expect that two tasks 
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that measure the same construct should correlate with each other. Finally, based on 
previous results from our own laboratory (Klein et al., 2012, 2014, 2016a) and from 
Weems and Watts (2005), we expected that the different cognitive biases would not 
only predict unique variance in spider fear-related behaviour but would also predict 
variance above and beyond self-reported spider fear. 
Methods
Participants
The current study was part of a large community-based project on childhood 
anxiety. After parental consent had been granted, a total of 718 children were 
screened on anxiety in their regular classroom environment. Approximately two 
months after initial screening, 95 children were invited to participate in this study. 
The children who participated in this study also participated in another study about 
social anxiety and were therefore pre-selected on levels of social anxiety. The data 
of 14 participants were excluded from the dataset, due to technical problems with 
the recording of the responses on the different tasks. As a result, the data of 81 
children (26 boys; 32%) between the ages of 8 and 13 (M = 10.2, SD = 1.1) were 
used in the analyses. 
An ANOVA with a homogeneity test revealed that this selection did not influence the 
variance in levels of spider fear as measured with the SADS-C, F(1,703) = 1.34, n.s. 
Children who participated in this study had slightly, but significantly higher scores 
on the SADS-C than the children in the screening, F(1,703) = 7.37, p = .007, eta2 = 
.01 (this study: M = 2.70, SD = 1.30; Screening: M = 2.36, SD = 1.19). Correlations 
between the SCARED social anxiety subscale (Bodden, Bögels, & Muris, 2009) and 
the SADS-C were comparable for the 718 children in the screening (r = .25, p < 
.001) and the 81 children of this study (r = .21, p = .066). The current sample partly 
overlapped with the sample in the study to validate the Auditory Interpretation Task 
(Klein et al., 2016b), and a study on the specificity of interpretation biases (Klein et 
al., 2016a). The Ethical Committee of the Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud 
University Nijmegen, the Netherlands, approved this study.
Instruments
Emotional Stroop Task (EST). The EST was used as a measure of distraction: We 
were interested in how the meaning of the stimuli catches attention and slows down 
performance in the colour-naming task (for a discussion of the EST, see Nightingale, 
60
Field, & Kindt, 2010). Two different versions of the EST were used in this study: a 
pictorial version and a word version. The pictorial version was identical to the task 
used by Klein and colleagues (2011) and consisted of three different categories; 
shapes of spiders, butterflies or wheels. The word version consisted of four different 
categories with each category including four words related to spiders (e.g. hairy), 
social situations (e.g. shame), happiness (e.g. happy), or general fear (e.g. worry). 
Both tasks were presented in a ‘card format’, so that identical shapes (EST-picture) 
or words (EST-word) of each category were presented at once on a computer screen. 
In total, each ‘card’ consisted of 24 stimuli presented in the four different colours 
(green, blue, red, yellow). Following a practice card, the experimental ‘cards’ were 
shown in random order. For each ‘card’, the children were instructed to name 
the different colours as quickly as possible without making errors. As soon as the 
child named all colours, the experimenter pushed the space bar again and the 
card disappeared. During the task, the experimenter recorded all colour naming 
mistakes, while the time between appearance and disappearance of each card was 
measured automatically and served as the dependent variable. 
Affective priming task (APT). We used the APT as a measure of threat-related 
associations. Despite the few studies that are reported in children, and the fact that 
is a reaction-time-based paradigm, Huijding and colleagues (2010) concluded that 
the APT is a task that promises to provide a good indirect measure of threat-related 
associations in children. The APT used in this study was very similar to the APT used 
by Klein and colleagues (2012). The APT is a task in which associations between 
prime stimuli and target stimuli are examined. The target stimuli were pictures of six 
faces of children (three boys, three girls) who looked either happy or fearful. These 
pictures had to be evaluated as either positive or negative as quickly as possible 
by pressing either the happy key (marked with a smile symbol) or the fearful key 
(marked with a fearful symbol). The key positions were counterbalanced across the 
sample and the pictures of the faces were shown in random order. Before each 
target stimulus, a prime stimulus word was presented. The prime words (three per 
category) were related to four different categories: negative feelings, happiness, 
spiders, and general fear words. Two sets of words were created, and each child was 
assigned to one of the sets (see Appendix 1 for all stimulus words). The prime words 
were presented for 1000 milliseconds, after which the target faces were presented 
until the children reacted by pressing a key. The time between the presentation of 
the target face and the reaction was measured. The children were instructed to first 
look at a cross that was presented in the middle of the screen, because this would be 
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the place where the prime appeared. When the prime appeared on the screen, the 
children were asked to look at the prime, but to ignore this prime when categorizing 
the subsequent target stimulus into negative or positive. All four prime categories 
were fully combined with the two target categories, yielding 8 combinations, each 
of which was presented 18 times. In total, the children categorized 144 faces, which 
were divided into three blocks of 48 trials each. The children took self-paced breaks 
between the blocks. Internal consistency for the different categories in this study 
ranged between alpha .57 and .82. Test-retest reliability for the Reaction Times 
between the three blocks was good (block 1 versus block 2: r = .77, p < .001; block 
1 versus block 3: r = .76, p < .001; block 2 versus block 3: r = .90, p < .001). Test-
retest reliability for the priming scores were near zero and non-significant (rs = -.10 
to.19). Directly following the 144 trials, the children were asked to recall as many 
prime words as they could remember. The total number of correctly recalled words 
related to spiders versus the happiness related words was used as an indication of 
memory bias. 
Spider Anxiety and Disgust Screening for Children (SADS-C). The SADS-C is a 
self-report questionnaire that measures responses to four spider-related statements 
on a 5-point scale (Klein, Van Niekerk, Baartmans, Rinck, & Becker, in press). The 
four statements address fear of spiders, physical reactions, avoidance, and disgust. 
Internal consistency and test-retest reliability are strong (α = .88, r = .91; Klein et al., 
in press). In this study, internal consistency was excellent (α = .90).
Behavioural Avoidance Test (BAT). This task was used to assess the children’s 
avoidance behaviour when confronted with a tarantula skin, which children believed 
to be a real, living spider. The task was identical to the BAT described by Klein 
and colleagues (2011). BAT performance was scored on a scale ranging from zero 
(no approach) to 8 (touching the spider skin). Right before the child was asked to 
approach the spider, the child was asked to indicate the size of the spider and the 
distance towards the spider as an indication of perceptual bias. As this task includes 
perception of something that the participant does not know precisely, this estimation 
might be affected by their interpretation of the situation. This task could therefore 
be seen as an indirect measure of interpretation bias, which assesses interpretation 
in a more indirect way than the most commonly used scenarios task (see also Vasey 
et al., 2012). Interpretation bias is often measured by means of a questionnaire 
or an ambiguous scenarios paradigm (see Muris, 2010). Disadvantages of these 
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measurements are that they are sensitive to experimenter demand and social 
desirability, and that they are sometimes time consuming. We therefore decided to 
follow a new procedure used by Vasey and colleagues (2012), in which they simply 
asked spider phobic adults to indicate the size of the spider from the tips of its 
front legs to the tips of its back legs. The children in this study were asked to point 
the estimated size on a ruler of 30 cm. The spider skin itself was approximately 
12 centimeter long. Additionally, we also asked the child to estimate the distance 
between themselves and the spider with the means of a white cord with small red 
tapes for every 50 cm and bigger red tapes for every meter. The child was of course 
unaware of the fact that he/she was exactly three meters away from the spider. The 
experimenter was unaware of the child’s level of spider fear during administration 
of the BAT.
Procedure
The testing was divided into two sessions. In the first session, the children performed 
the word version of the EST followed by the APT and the spider BAT individually, 
accompanied by a trained research assistant. In the second session, the children 
performed the pictorial version of the EST followed by the SADS-C individually, 
again accompanied by the trained research assistant. We chose this order because 
of the necessity to measure reliable reaction times during the EST and the APT, 
given a limited attention span in children. The children were free to refuse the tasks 
and could stop at any time. The children received a certificate for participating. 
Results
Descriptives 
Emotional Stroop tasks (EST). The overall number of mistakes was low, for both 
the EST-picture (0.8%) and the EST-word (0.5%). From the EST-picture card RTs and 
the EST-word card RTs, two relative scores related to spiders were computed; that 
is, the EST-picture score (RT-Spider minus RT-Neutral) and the EST-word score (RT-
Spider minus RT-Neutral). Higher scores indicate larger distraction by the spider 
category. Two one-sample t-tests revealed that children did not show significant 
distraction specifically related to spiders in the word version, t(80) = 1.7, p > .1, or 
the pictorial version, although the latter approached significance, t(80) = 1.9, p = 
.064. There were no significant correlations between age and Stroop scores (EST-
picture: r = .04, p >.1; EST-word: r = -.14, p > .1), nor were there effects of gender 
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(EST-picture: F(1,79) < .1, p > .1; EST-word: F(1,79) = .35, p > .1).
Size and distance estimation. The mean estimated size of the spider was 10.4 
cm (SD = 3.4; min = 3.0 cm, max = 21 cm). The mean estimated distance from the 
spider was 2.9 meters (SD = .75; min = 1.8 m, max = 5.0 m). Bivariate correlations 
indicated that there was neither a significant correlation between age and estimated 
spider size (r = .07, p > .1) nor was there a significant correlation between age and 
estimated distance (r = .06, p > .1). There was a significant gender difference for the 
estimated spider size, F(1,79) = 4.79, p = .032, girls (M = 10.9; SD = 3.4) estimated 
the spider as being larger than boys did (M = 9.2; SD = 3.2). There was no gender 
difference for the estimated distance from the spider, F(1,79) = .95, p > .1. 
Memory task. From the number of remembered items, a relative memory score 
related to spiders was calculated for each child: the mean number of remembered 
spider-related words was subtracted from the mean positive-related remembered 
words. A one-sample t-test revealed that children did remember significantly more 
spider-related words than positive-related words, t(80) = 3.42, p = .001. There was 
neither a significant correlation between age and the number of remembered items 
(r = -.01, p > .1), nor was there an effect of gender, F(1,79) = 1.24, p > .1.
Affective priming task (APT). The average number of mistakes was 4.2%. From the 
RTs, a relative priming score related to spiders was calculated for each child: The 
mean negative target RT was subtracted from the mean positive target RT. Positive 
scores indicate that the spider primes pre-activate fearful faces more than smiling 
faces, and vice versa for negative scores. A one-sample t-test revealed that the 
spider priming score did not differ significantly from 0, t(80) = 1.18, p > .1. Thus, on 
average, the children did not show negative associations related to spider words. 
There was neither a significant correlation between age and the priming score (r = 
-.0,1 p > .1), nor was there an effect of gender, F(1,79) = 2.66, p > .1. 
SADS-C questionnaire. The mean score on the SADS-C was 2.5 (SD = 1.1; min 
= 1, max = 4.4). There was neither a significant correlation between age and self-
reported spider fear (r = .07, p >.1), nor was there an effect of gender, F(1,79) < .1, 
p > .1.
Behavioural Assessment Test (BAT). The children's mean BAT score was 5.6 (SD = 
2.1; min = 0, max = 8). There was neither a significant correlation between age and 
BAT score (r = .15, p > .1), nor was there an effect of gender, F(1,79) < .1, p > .1.
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Correlations
As expected, children who reported more fear of spiders approached the spider 
less closely r = -.45 (p < .001). We also found an attention bias; both the EST-picture 
score and the EST-word score correlated significantly with self-reported fear of 
spiders (EST-picture: r = .24, p = .015; EST-word r = .31, p = .003) and with the BAT 
(EST-picture: r = -.23, p = .021; EST-word r = -.26, p = .012). We also found evidence 
for an interpretation bias; children who estimated the spider as being larger reported 
higher levels of spider fear (r = .38, p < .001), but they did not approach the spider 
less closely (r = -.07, p > .1) than children who estimated the spider as being smaller. 
On the other hand, children who estimated the spider as being closer, avoided the 
spider more on the BAT (r = .30, p = .004), but these children did not report more 
fear of spiders (r = .005, p > .1). There was no evidence for a memory bias; the 
number of relative recalled items related to spiders was unrelated to SADS-C scores 
(r = .12, p > .1) or BAT scores (r = -.05, p > .1). Finally, children with stronger threat-
related spider associations avoided the spider significantly more (r = -.28, p = .006), 
but they did not report more fear of spiders (r = .13, p > .1) than children with more 
positive spider-associations (see Table 1).  
Next, we correlated all bias scores with each other. As expected, children with a high 
spider distraction score on the EST-picture also had a higher score on the EST-word, 
r = .46 (p < .001). The EST-picture also correlated significantly with threat-related 
associations, r = .34 (p = .001), indicating that children with more distraction on 
the pictorial version of the Stroop also displayed more threat-related associations 
on the APT. Furthermore, the EST-word correlated significantly with the spider-
size estimation r = .26 (p = .011), meaning that children with an attention bias, 
also estimated the spider as being larger. Finally, the word version of the Stroop 
also correlated marginally significant with spider-distance estimation, r = -.18 (p = 
.050), suggesting that children who displayed an attention bias had the tendency to 
estimate the spider as being closer by. All other scores were unrelated to each other 
 (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Correlations between SADS-C, BAT, and bias measures, controlled for 
gender (n = 81)
Regression Analysis
To test whether the different cognitive biases explained unique variance in fear-
related behaviour measured by the BAT, we performed a regression analysis 
with BAT scores as the criterion. The bias scores were entered as predictors; APT 
spider priming scores, size estimations, distance estimations and recall scores. 
Furthermore, we also included a weighted z-score based on the EST-picture score 
and the EST-word score to avoid collinearity. As expected, the model was significant, 
and explained 19% of the variance in BAT behaviour, F(5,75) = 3.52, p = .007. APT 
spider priming scores, spider attention bias scores, and spider distance scores were 
significant predictors. Thus, threat-related spider associations, attention bias, and 
interpretation bias (distance estimation) predicted unique variance in fear-related 
behaviour on the BAT (see Table 2). 
Next, we repeated this analysis, but we now included SADS-C scores in the first 
step, before entering all bias scores in the second step. After the first step, the 
model was significant F(1,79) = 19.60, p < .001, and explained 20% of the variance 
in BAT behaviour. After the second step F(6,74) = 6.56, p < .001, the model also 
reached significance, and explained 35% of the variance in in BAT behaviour. This 
second model was also significantly better than the first model F(5,74) = 3.36, p 
= .009. For this second model, SADS-C scores, APT spider priming scores, and 
spider distance estimates were significant predictors. Thus, threat-related spider-
associations and interpretation bias (distance estimation) each predicted unique 
variance in fear-related behaviour on the BAT, above and beyond self-reported fear 
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(see Table 2).
Table 2. Hierarchical regression analyses predicting BAT scores (n = 81).
Discussion
This study is the first to combine attention bias, interpretation bias, memory bias, 
and threat-related associations, to examine their inter-relations and to test the 
independent ability of these biases to predict avoidance of spiders in children. The 
first goal of this study was to replicate the findings of the current study to earlier 
studies by Klein and colleagues (2011, 2012). Consistent with our earlier results, 
we found that spider-fearful children displayed both attention bias and threat-
related associations and that these biases predicted unique variance in behavioural 
avoidance of spiders. Furthermore, in line with findings from the broader childhood 
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anxiety literature, spider-fearful children, just like children with other anxieties, show 
an interpretation bias for threatening information (e.g., Muris, 2010). These findings 
support the importance of attention biases, interpretation biases and threat-
related associations in anxiety (for an overview see, Hadwin & Field, 2010). To our 
knowledge, this is the first study in which we found evidence for a relation between 
fear of spiders and size and distance estimation; spider fearful children indicated 
the spider as being larger and closer by than non-fearful children. Furthermore, 
we also showed that this bias is distinct from other cognitive processes. Spider 
distance estimation predicted unique variance in behavioural avoidance above 
and beyond the variance predicted by other cognitive bias measures and self-
reported fear. This suggests that this variation of measuring interpretation bias, 
which is also referred to as a (visual) perceptual bias, is a unique bias in explaining 
fearful behaviour. Furthermore, it also suggests that more indirect measures of 
interpretation bias correlate significantly with spider fear measures. This result is 
in line with the findings in adult anxiety (Vasey et al., 2012), namely that spider-
fearful adults have a tendency to overestimate the size of a spider. The children in 
this study also underestimated their distance from the spider, which is in line with 
results found in height phobia where a link between overestimation of heights and 
fear of heights was observed (e.g., Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, & Proffitt, 
2008). Aside from finding attention, interpretation, and association biases, we did 
not find support for a memory bias. We found that all children remembered more 
spider-related words compared to positive-related words and this memory effect 
was not related to spider fear. This non-significant correlation between memory 
bias and fear is in line with most studies (see, Coles & Heimberg, 2002), although 
there are also a few studies that have found evidence for a memory bias (e.g., Klein 
et al., 2014). 
The second goal of this study was to explore relations between different biases and 
to explore the ability of these biases to predict spider fear behaviour, above and 
beyond self-reported fear. The results showed that the different biases correlated 
only weakly with each other, but that attention, interpretation and threat-related 
associations predicted unique variance in fear-related behaviour in the BAT. These 
results indicate that, despite their minimal overlap, attention and interpretation 
biases and threat-related associations are all important processes in explaining 
fearful behaviour. Furthermore, when we included self-reported fear as a predictor 
in the regression model, both interpretation bias and threat-related associations 
remained significant predictors of avoidance behaviour. These results are in line 
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with our hypotheses and with previous studies of child and adult anxiety (Klein et al., 
2011; 2012; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Watts & Weems, 2006) and supports cognitive 
models of childhood anxiety (Muris & Field, 2008; Weems & Watts, 2005). Our 
finding suggests that both these cognitive biases are useful for predicting fear-
related behaviour in children, independently of each other, and over and above the 
predictive power achieved by self-reports. The findings underline the importance 
of automatic processes in fear-related behaviour and support the use of indirect 
measures in research settings.
Interestingly, we did not find significant correlations between some of the indirect 
measures and self-reported fear in the SADS-C or with behavioural avoidance 
in the BAT. For example, priming effects in the Affective Priming Task correlated 
significantly with behavioural avoidance, but not with self-reported fear. Correlations 
between direct and indirect measures have indeed been found in previous (adult) 
research (e.g., Teachman & Woody, 2003), but results similar to ours have also been 
reported (e.g., Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Klein et al., 2012). These results are in line 
with several dual-process models (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Beck & Clark, 1997): 
They indicate that self-reports and indirect tasks may measure different processes, 
which are not necessarily closely related to each other (see also Huijding & de Jong, 
2006; Klein et al., 2011). Self-reports may reflect more controlled processes while 
many cognitive processes are more automatic and not open to introspection and 
self-report (see also Bijtebier, Vasey, & Braet, 2003). The lack of relation between 
direct and indirect measures may also explain why some earlier studies did not find 
stronger threat-related associations in children with high levels of self-reported fear 
(see also Huijding & de Jong, 2006; Klein et al., 2011). 
Another finding that needs clarification is the fact that some of the indirect measures 
did and some of the measures did not correlate significantly with each other. For 
example, threat-related associations in the word-based Affective Priming Task 
correlated significantly with attention bias in the picture-version of the Emotional 
Stroop Task, but not in the word-version, although the latter employed partly the 
same words as the Affective Priming Task. We could not find a specific pattern in the 
correlations of the different measures, except for the significant correlation between 
the pictorial version and the word version of the Emotional Stroop Task, which are 
similar tasks measuring the same construct. Although the different tasks supposedly 
tap distinct automatic processes, these processes are thought to interact at certain 
points. It is therefore expected that the measures will not correlate highly with each 
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other, but should show some overlap. This null finding is in line with several other 
studies that failed to find significant correlations between different cognitive biases 
(Klein et al., 2012, 2014, 2016a; Watts & Weems, 2006). There are also several 
studies in adult anxiety that only found limited evidence for the overlap of different 
cognitive biases (e.g., van Bockstaele et al., 2011). The lack of correlations between 
indirect measures might be explained by insufficient reliability of these measures 
(Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Brown et al., 2014). Furthermore, different 
task characteristics of the Affective Priming Task, the Emotional Stroop Task, and the 
interpretation task may also be a reason why the tasks did not correlate with each 
other (e.g., words versus pictures and reaction times versus free responses; see also 
De Houwer, 2003). Perhaps if the processing biases had been assessed with the 
same task (e.g., where participants have to make sense of a particular situation), 
biases in attention, interpretation, and memory, and the activated associations 
might be more strongly correlated. For example, Everaert, Duyck and Koster (2014) 
studied multiple cognitive biases in adult depression and found that attention bias 
during a scrambled-sentences task predicted interpretation bias in the task, and 
later memory bias for the meaning of the sentences. Unfortunately, as yet, there 
are virtually no tasks that are designed to capture multiple biases in children. Cleary 
more studies are needed that include a task that is able to capture several processes 
simultaneously. Alternatively, one might speculate that threat-related associations, 
threat distraction and biased perception are simply not as closely related to each 
other as one might expect (see also Van Bockstaele et al., 2011; Watts & Weems, 
2006). Clearly new theory and research on this topic is needed, using more reliable 
tasks, and different samples including children with different fears and anxieties.
Regarding the relation between threat-related associations and fear-related 
behaviour, in the present study we found the expected priming effect: The more 
children avoided the spider during the BAT, the more quickly they responded to 
fear-congruent compared to fear-incongruent trials of the Affective Priming Task. 
This result is in line with adult studies (e.g., Reinecke, Becker, & Rinck, 2010) but 
contrasts with the only other study that has found threat-related associations in 
children with the Affective Priming Task, because that study found a reversed 
priming effect, that is, the more children avoided the during the BAT, the more 
quickly they responded to fear-incongruent than to fear-congruent trials (Klein et 
al., 2012). There are various theoretical models explaining priming effects (Fazio, 
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Karrdes, 1986; Hermans, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001), but 
also models explaining reversed priming effects (Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Hermans, 
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Spruyt, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2003; Maier, Berner, & Pekrun, 2003; Wentura & 
Rothermund, 2003). These differences might be due to low reliability of the priming 
scores of the APT in this study, which is often found in reaction time paradigms in 
children (see also Brown et al., 2014). However, the fact that we found a significant 
relation between the APT and behavioural avoidance speaks against this argument. 
Clearly, more research is needed to further explore the reliability of the Affective 
Priming Task in child samples and the interaction between priming effects, anxiety, 
and avoidant behaviour in children.
The current study has several limitations. First, the 95 children in the current sample 
were preselected from 718 children. Even though this subgroup of 95 children 
was comparable to the original 718 children, many more children were invited 
to participate in this first screening. We did not register how many children were 
originally invited, and a response bias could thus have influenced the composition 
of the sample. Additionally, we did not collect demographic data. Furthermore, 
due to a relatively low number of children, we only had enough power to test our 
hypotheses for the stimuli that were specifically related to spiders. As a result, it is 
not clear whether the results are specific to spider fear or reflect a more general 
negative bias. Finally, even though we found evidence for several cognitive biases, 
we did not include a clinical sample in our study. In future research, we recommend 
larger samples and inclusion of clinical participants, to be able to compare spider-
specific stimuli to general stimuli in the different tasks, and to see whether the 
results generalize to children with an anxiety diagnosis. 
Based on our findings, we recommend using both direct and indirect measures 
in research settings, because they seem to tap into distinct processes which 
complement each other in the prediction of fearful behaviour. Moreover, both types 
of measures have specific advantages and disadvantages. Direct measures are 
usually fast, easy and reliable, but also more sensitive to experimenter demand, 
social desirability, and limited self-awareness (e.g., Bijttebier et al., 2003). Indirect 
measures may provide a clearer picture of the underlying cognitive processes, but 
they are frequently less reliable than direct measures because they usually require 
the measurement of reaction times. This measurement may be especially difficult 
in child samples because young children are generally more easily distracted 
and have relatively short attention spans, which may render the measurement of 
reaction times less reliable (Huijding et al., 2010). This is one of the reasons for 
our choice of "card" versions of the Emotional Stroop Task, rather than a version 
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in which latencies of reactions to single stimuli are measured (see also Klein et al., 
2011). We further recommend the simultaneous use of different indirect measures, 
as it seems that fearful children differ from other children with respect to several 
cognitive processes (see also Weems & Watts, 2005; Watts & Weems, 2006). Here, 
we found evidence of differences in attention, interpretation and associations. This 
study was limited to fear of spiders, and we recommend the study of other types of 
fears and anxieties as well.
In summation, we found that the current versions of the Emotional Stroop Task 
(attention bias), the estimation of distance from a spider (interpretation bias), and 
the Affective Priming Task (threat-related associations) were able to independently 
predict fear-related behaviour. The current version of the distance estimation task 
and the Affective Priming Task were even able to independently predict fear-related 
behaviour, over and above the variance explained by self-reported fear. Therefore, 
using these tasks in addition to self-reports allowed an improved prediction of fear-
related avoidance. These results are theoretically supported by dual process models 
(e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Beck & Clark, 1997). To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study to find evidence that attention bias, interpretation bias, and threat-
related association each predict unique variance in spider fear-related behaviour. 
This unique insight can be used to further conceptualize theoretical models of 
childhood anxiety.
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Chapter4
Biases in Interpretation as a Vulnerability 
Factor for Children of Parents with an 
Anxiety Disorder
Based on: van Niekerk, R. E., Klein, A. M., Allart-van Dam., Rinck, M., Hutschemaekers, 
G. J., & Becker, E. S. (2017). Biases in interpretation as a vulnerability factor for 
children of parents with an anxiety disorder. Manuscript submitted for publication.
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Abstract
Interpretation biases are a proposed underlying factor in the intergenerational 
transmission of anxiety. However, it is unclear to which degree children’s biased 
interpretations relate to parental diagnoses, and if these biases pose a specific 
vulnerability factor. First, we investigated if children of parents with an anxiety disorder 
show an interpretation bias similar to their parents’ diagnosis. We hypothesized that 
priming might be necessary to find this interpretation bias in children with subclinical 
levels of anxiety. Second, we explored whether children's interpretation biases can 
be predicted by parental and/or children’s levels of anxiety.  In total, 44 children of 
parents with a panic disorder, 27 children of parents with a social anxiety disorder, 
7 children of parents with a social anxiety disorder and a panic disorder and 84 
children of parents without an anxiety disorder (controls) participated in this study. 
Parents and children filled out the SCARED questionnaire and children performed 
two ambiguous scenario tasks: one with and one without video priming. Results 
showed that children of parents with a panic disorder displayed significantly more 
negative interpretations of panic scenarios and social scenarios than controls, even 
though levels of anxiety symptoms did not differ between the groups. Children of 
parents with a social anxiety disorder showed a more general negative interpretation 
of the social scenarios. Priming did not affect interpretation. Both parental and child 
panic symptom levels were relevant for predicting panic interpretation bias, while 
only child social anxiety levels were relevant for predicting social interpretation bias. 
Our results suggest that biases in interpretation qualify as a possible vulnerability 
factor for children of parents with an anxiety disorder.
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Children of parents with an anxiety disorder have a higher risk to develop an 
anxiety disorder than children of parents without an anxiety disorder (Hettema, 
Neale, & Kendler, 2001). Studies report heritability estimates of 30–50% for anxiety 
symptoms in children (Shimada–Sugimoto, Otowa, & Hettema, 2015). Parental 
anxiety is not regarded as a causal risk factor itself, but is likely to be mediated via 
other mechanisms (Donovan & Spence, 2000). From a preventive perspective, it is 
crucial to improve our knowledge about the mechanisms that increase vulnerability 
for psychopathology in children of anxious parents.
Recently, cognitive theories have proposed that biases in cognitive processing 
may be an underlying factor in the intergenerational transmission of anxiety 
(Hadwin & Field, 2010). The link between interpretation biases and anxiety is firmly 
demonstrated in both adult and child studies (Hadwin, Garner, & Perez-Olivas, 2006). 
Interpretation bias refers to the tendency of anxious individuals, compared to non-
anxious individuals, to form a threatening interpretation of ambiguous situations and 
stimuli. Several paradigms have been used to study interpretation biases, of which 
ambiguous scenario tasks are most frequently used. In these tasks, participants have 
to finish several scenarios by choosing an optional ending that varies in levels of 
threat, or give their own ending to the story. For instance, an ambiguous social 
scenario about meeting a new group of people can be ended in a threatening 
way (they will ignore you) or in a more positive way (they smile and talk to you). 
Like anxious adults, highly anxious children interpret ambiguous scenarios as more 
threatening (for a review see Muris, 2010). Moreover, some studies have shown that 
anxiety levels can be predicted by interpretation biases in children as young as two 
years of age (Dodd, Hudson, Morris, & Wise, 2011). An open question that remains 
is how specific these biases are: While content-specificity of interpretation biases in 
adults is relatively well established, evidence of content-specificity in child studies 
is limited. Some studies found specific relationships between interpretation biases 
and corresponding anxiety levels in community samples and in clinical populations 
(Klein et al., 2016; Vassilopoulos & Banerjee, 2012), whilst other studies did not 
clearly show these results (Bögels, Snieder, & Kindt, 2003; Muris, Kindt, et al., 2000). 
With threat-related biases being characteristic for anxious individuals, it would follow 
that if biases are transmitted from one generation to the next, children of parents 
with an anxiety disorder should show similar biases or antecedents of these biases 
(Rapee, 2012). Anxious parents might somehow transmit the specific interpretations 
and associations which are related to their disorder to their children, which makes 
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their children more vulnerable to developing a similar anxiety disorder. To date, 
little is known about the role that cognitive biases might play in the increased 
vulnerability of children of anxious parents. There are a few studies that investigated 
interpretation biases in familial relationships (e.g. Lester, Field, Oliver, & Cartwright-
Hatton, 2009; Orchard, Cooper, & Creswell, 2015). However, these studies included 
either community samples or samples of clinically anxious children, which is not 
informative about how specific parental diagnoses relate to interpretation biases 
of the child. Therefore, the aim of the current study was to study the presence of 
interpretation biases in children of parents with an anxiety disorder.   
The current study was based on the single published study that focused on the 
transmission of interpretation biases and included a clinically anxious parent group 
(Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin, & Margraf, 2002). Schneider and colleagues (2002) 
presented ambiguous scenarios to three groups of children: children of parents 
with a panic disorder, children of parents with an animal phobia and children of 
non-anxious parents. They administered the scenarios task twice, the second 
time preceding the task with video priming. Priming is assumed to increase the 
accessibility of already existing anxiety associations and linked threat information, 
thereby making it more likely that information-processing resources are directed 
towards threat (Strack & Deutsch, 2015). Schneider et al. (2002) found that children 
of parents with a panic disorder displayed significantly more negative interpretations 
of panic-related physical sensations after they had seen the panic priming video. 
This effect was not found for the other scenarios, which suggests that the bias of the 
child was specifically related to the parental diagnosis. 
The objective of the current study was to investigate the characteristics and 
specificity of interpretation bias in children of parents with a panic disorder and/or a 
social anxiety disorder, compared to children of parents without an anxiety disorder. 
The first aim of this study was to investigate whether children of parents with an 
anxiety disorder show an interpretation bias similar to their parents’ diagnosis, even 
when controlling for their own levels of anxiety. It was expected that children of 
parents with a panic disorder would show the most negative interpretations of the 
panic scenarios, followed by children of parents with a social anxiety disorder (due 
to comorbidity between panic disorder and social anxiety disorder), followed by 
children of non-anxious parents (controls). For the social scenarios, a similar specific 
relationship was expected, with children of parents with a social anxiety disorder 
scoring highest, followed by children of parents with a panic disorder, followed by 
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controls. As Schneider et al. (2002) showed that priming might activate a latent 
fear schema in children-at-risk but yet without symptoms, we hypothesized that 
priming would be necessary to find the expected differences in interpretation 
biases described above. The second aim of this study was to examine whether 
child interpretation biases can be predicted by levels of anxiety of the parent and/
or levels of anxiety of the child. Since the anxious parents in our study had a lifetime 
panic disorder or lifetime social anxiety disorder, some of the parents might not 
have had symptoms of their lifetime disorders at the time of testing. Therefore, 
levels of current parental anxiety could be relevant for the prediction of current 
interpretation biases of the child. Based on previous studies (Creswell, Cooper, & 
Murray, 2010), we expected that both child and parental panic levels would predict 
interpretation biases related to panic situations and that both child and parental 
social anxiety levels would predict interpretation bias related to social situations. 
Methods
Participants
Participants were aged between 7 and 14 years (M = 10.16, SD = 1.58). We recruited 
three groups of children: children of a parent with a panic disorder with or without 
agoraphobia (PD), children of a parent with a social anxiety disorder (SAD) and 
children of parents with no anxiety disorders (control group). For the children of 
a parent with PD and/or SAD, at least one parent had to have the target lifetime 
diagnosis, while for the control children neither parent had a history of anxiety 
disorders during the life of the child and no lifetime social anxiety disorder or panic 
disorder (see Table 1 for gender distribution). Children of parents with a diagnosed 
anxiety disorder (n = 67) were recruited via the treatment facility of the parents, 
where parental diagnoses were assessed with MINI semi-structured interviews 
(Vliet, Leroy, & Megen, 2000) by licensed therapists. We did not obtain a diagnostic 
interview of the partner of the anxious parent. Children were included in the study if 
their biological parent had a social anxiety disorder or panic disorder after the child 
had been born. Control children were recruited via connections of the authors (n 
= 26) and a participating school (n = 69), and their parents were interviewed either 
face-to-face or by telephone with the MINI diagnostic interview by trained and 
supervised master students to rule out panic disorder and social anxiety diagnoses. 
Lifetime and current diagnoses were assessed. Furthermore, it was assessed 
whether the disorder was present during the life of the child and whether parents 
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had ever followed treatment for anxiety disorders or other psychological problems 
at some point during their life. Four parents of the recruited control children had 
a panic disorder or social anxiety disorder during the life of their child, so they 
were included in the group with the corresponding diagnosis. Seven children of 
the control group were excluded after the data collection at school because the 
MINI interview with the parent revealed that they did not meet the inclusion criteria 
for the clinical or control groups. There were 37 children of whom also a sibling 
participated in this study. Parental scores were coupled with each of their children.
The final sample consisted of 44 children of parents with panic disorder, 27 children 
of parents with social anxiety disorder, 84 children of parents without an anxiety 
disorder and 7 children whose parents were both diagnosed with a social anxiety 
and panic disorder. These 7 children were not included in the split-group analyses, 
but were included in the correlational analyses.
Questionnaires
Aside from the MINI interview, parents completed several questionnaires, one 
of which was used in this study: the Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional 
Disorders, Adult version (SCARED-A; Bögels & van Melick, 2004). This parental 
questionnaire is similar to the version the children filled out (SCARED-71; Bodden, 
Bögels, & Muris, 2009). Both the parental and the child version had excellent 
Crohnbach’s α (α = .96 and α = .94). 
Interpretation Task with and without Priming
Interpretation bias was measured with an ambiguous scenarios task, with four 
different endings per scenario. The task consisted of 42 scenarios that were divided 
into four categories: panic-related scenarios (12), social-related scenarios (12), 
spider-related scenarios (12) and separation-related scenarios (6). The set of 42 
scenarios was adapted and translated into Dutch from existing materials (Bögels et 
al., 2003; Creswell, Schniering, & Rapee, 2005; Klein et al., 2015; Muris, Luermans, 
Merckelbach, & Mayer, 2000; Schneider et al., 2002) or created by the authors. The 
four different endings reflected answers that were either positive, neutral, general 
negative or specific negative interpretations of the situation. The specific negative 
endings were based on cognitions of children with a diagnosed anxiety disorder; see 
Appendix 1 for a sample story with the four endings. The children were asked to rank 
the four scenario-endings in the order that reflected which ending was most likely 
to happen to them (4, most likely; 1, least likely). The outcome values were ranking 
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scores, and mean ranking scores were calculated for each negative answer type 
(general negative and specific negative) per scenario category, similar to Voncken 
et al. (2003). Children performed two versions of the task: first, the version without 
priming and approximately one week later, the second version with priming. The 
non-priming version consisted of three blocks of 8 randomized scenarios each; the 
priming version consisted of three blocks of 6 scenarios each. In the priming version, 
children saw three videos, each containing a female patient in the age range of the 
children’s mothers who told the children what it was like to have a certain anxiety 
disorder (panic disorder, social anxiety disorder, or spider phobia). Directly following 
the video, the children read the 6 ambiguous scenarios that corresponded with the 
priming video, followed by a video of a therapist explaining how you can overcome 
this fear. Children saw the three priming videos with corresponding scenarios and 
therapist videos in randomized order. In the present study, only the panic and social 
anxiety scenarios were used for investigating the research aims. 
Procedure 
Written informed consent was obtained from the parents (and also from the 
children if they were 12 years or older). The research proposal was approved and 
in accordance with the ethical standards of the Radboud University Behavioural 
Science Institute research committee. Since the current study was part of a large 
multicenter project about the intergenerational transmission of anxiety (the SPRING 
project), other cognitive bias tasks and questionnaires were administered as well. A 
full list of materials and tasks is available by contacting the corresponding author. 
The children participated in two sessions of three hours each and the anxious parent 
(or one of the control parents) participated in a single session of one hour. The 
other parent was asked to fill out two questionnaires. If more children of one family 
participated, the parents completed a one-hour session for each child. All sessions 
took place either at the participant’s house, at an elementary school in the nearby 
region of Nijmegen or at Radboud University in Nijmegen. When the children 
participated at home, they were tested in a specially equipped research van of the 
Behavioural Science Institute of Radboud University, which served as a quiet testing 
room. Trained master students tested the participants. 
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Results
Descriptives and anxiety levels
The child groups differed significantly neither in age, F(2,152) = .13, p = .88, nor 
in gender, X2(3), p = .770. To test if there were significant differences between the 
three groups on child and/or parental anxiety scores, we performed six ANOVAs 
with group as independent variable and child/parental SCARED total scores, panic 
scores and social scores as dependent variables. The three child groups did not 
differ significantly from each other in total anxiety scores, F(2,149) = .33, p = .72, 
η2 = .004, panic scores F(2,151) = 1.32, p = .27, η2 = .02 and social anxiety scores 
F(2,151) = 1.73, p = .18, η2 = .02. Furthermore, mean sum scores did not cross the 
clinical cut-off score of 30 for the SCARED total score, or the cut-off score of 8 for the 
SCARED subscales for any of the three groups. As expected, anxiety scores of the 
parents in the three groups differed significantly in accordance with their diagnosis, 
for total anxiety scores F(2,137) = 46.35, p < .001, η2 = .40, panic scores F(2,137) 
= 73.94, p < .001, η2 = .52 and social anxiety scores F(2,137) = 52.46, p < .001, η2 
= .43. There were no significant differences between groups for parental gender, 
X2(2) = 1.99, p = .37, or age, F(2,133) = 2.99, p = .054,  η2 = .04 (see Table 1 for an 
overview of all results). As is shown in Table 2, correlations between parental and 
child anxiety levels were not significant. As predicted, the children's panic scores 
correlated significantly with their social anxiety scores, r = .57, p < .001, as did the 
parents' scores, r = .46, p < .001.
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Child and Parental Anxiety Scores. 
Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means. The group of children of parents with PD and SAD did 
not include enough participants for comparison to the other groups. 
* p < .05, **p < .001. Means with different superscripts within rows are significantly different based on Holm-Bonferroni 
post-hoc paired comparisons. 
88
Specificity of biases in relation to parental anxiety disorder
Before examining whether the groups of children of PD-parents and SAD-parents 
showed specific biases related to their parents’ diagnosis, we first tested whether 
there were overall group differences on the scenarios and whether priming affected 
the interpretations of the scenarios. We used two ranking scores in these analyses: 
the ranking score of the general negative interpretation category (interpreting the 
ambiguous story as negative, without specific anxiety disorder related cognitions) 
and specific negative interpretation category (interpreting the ambiguous scenario 
as threatening, i.e., anxiety disorder related cognitions). Two repeated-measures 
ANOVAs were performed, separately for the dependent variables ‘general negative 
interpretation score’ and ‘specific negative interpretation score’, with version of the 
interpretation task (priming, non-priming) and scenario category (panic-related vs. 
social-related) as within-subjects variables, and group as between-subjects variable 
(children of PD, SAD and control-parents) in both analyses. Only the relevant 
outcomes are reported. There was no significant interaction of Task Version x Group 
x Scenario Category, neither for the general negative interpretation score, F(2,143) 
= 1.32, p = .27, η2 = .02, nor for the specific negative interpretation score, F(2,143) 
= 0.02, p = .98, η2 < .001, indicating that priming did not affect the interpretation 
of the scenarios. Therefore, we used the combined mean scores of both versions of 
the interpretation task for the follow-up analyses. Other interactions that included 
Task Version were non-significant as well. Regarding overall group differences on 
the scenarios, there was a significant interaction of Scenario x Group for both the 
general negative interpretation score, F(2,143) = 4.22, p = .017, η2 = .06 and the 
specific negative interpretation score, F(2,143) = 3.23, p = .042, η2 = .04. This 
indicates that the groups ranked the negative interpretations of the two scenarios 
differently. 
Follow-up analyses were used to answer how the groups differed from each other 
on the two scenarios, thereby further investigating the first research aim: whether 
children of parents with an anxiety disorder show an interpretation bias similar to 
their parents’ diagnosis, even when controlling for their own levels of anxiety. To 
test this, two MANCOVAs were performed separately for each scenario type (panic/
social) with group as between-subjects variable, the two negative interpretation 
scores of the panic or social scenarios (general negative and specific negative) as 
dependent variables, and the corresponding anxiety questionnaire subscale score 
(panic/social anxiety) as covariate. Bootstrapping was used as a correction of non-
normality (see Table 3 for Means and Main results). 
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Panic scenarios. The first MANCOVA revealed that the three groups differed 
significantly on the negative panic interpretation score, F(4,296) = 5.80, p < .001, η2 
= .07, while controlling for level of panic symptoms of the child. More specifically, 
univariate tests showed that the groups did not differ significantly on the general 
negative interpretation score, F(2,149) = .16, p = .85, η2 = .002, but they did differ 
significantly on the specific negative interpretation score F(2,149) = 11.68, p < .001, 
η2 = .14. As expected, post-hoc tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979) 
showed that the children of PD-parents scored highest and differed significantly from 
both the children of SAD-parents (p = .001) and the children of control parents (p < 
.001). However, the children of SAD-parents and controls did not differ significantly 
from each other (p = .76). These results indicate that, even when controlling for 
the child’s own anxiety, the children of PD-parents showed more specific negative 
interpretations, but not more general negative interpretations, of the panic scenarios 
than the other two groups.
Social scenarios. The second MANCOVA revealed that the three groups differed 
on the threat interpretation scores of the social scenarios, F(4,296) = 4.51, p <. 001, 
η2 = .06, both for the general negative interpretations, F(2,149) = 6.14, p = .003, 
η2 = .08,  and the specific negative interpretations, F(2,149) = 5.62, p = .004, η2 = 
.07. For the general negative interpretation score, we found that both the children 
of SAD-parents and the children of PD-parents scored significantly higher than the 
children of the control parents (p = .02 and p = .002, respectively). They did not 
differ significantly from each other (p = .79). A different pattern was found for the 
specific negative interpretation score: The children of PD-parents scored highest 
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and differed significantly from the controls (p = .001), but did not score significantly 
higher than the children of SAD-parents (p = .16). The scores of the children of SAD-
parents were not significantly different from the controls (p = .23). This indicates that 
even though levels of anxiety symptoms between groups did not differ significantly, 
the children of SAD-parents and the children of PD-parents displayed significantly 
more general negative interpretations of the social scenarios than the control group, 
with the children of PD-parents displaying more specific negative interpretations 
than the control group.
Prediction of interpretation biases
To investigate the second research aim of this study, whether child interpretation 
biases are better predicted by the anxiety level of the parent or the anxiety level of 
the child, we performed four bootstrapped linear regression analyses in which we 
included level of parental panic, parental social anxiety, child panic and child social 
anxiety as predictors. The four dependent variables were the general negative and 
specific negative interpretation scores from both the panic and the social scenarios. 
First, we predicted the general negative panic interpretation score with the four 
anxiety predictors. The regression model was significant, F(4,142) = 5.14, p = .001, 
R2adj = .10, with child social anxiety level as the only significant predictor (β = .37, p 
= .002, 95% CI = 0.13 to 0.53). Second, we predicted the specific negative panic 
interpretation score with the four anxiety predictors. The regression model was 
significant, F(4,142) = 5.08, p = .001, R2adj = .10, with parental panic level (β = .24, 
p = .02, 95% CI = .006 to .04) as significant predictor, as was child panic level 
when inspecting the bootstrapped confidence interval, since zero is not included 
in this interval (β = .18, p = .068, 95% CI = .001 to .07). These results regarding 
panic-related scenarios suggest that the general negative interpretation is best 
predicted by social anxiety of the child, and the specific negative interpretation is 
best predicted by parental panic level and child panic level. Third, we predicted 
the general negative social interpretation score with the four anxiety predictors. 
The regression model was significant, F(4,142) = 16.68, p < .001, R2adj = .31, with 
child social anxiety level (β=.47, p=.001, 95% CI =.03 to .06) as the only significant 
predictor. Fourth, we predicted the specific negative social interpretation score with 
the four anxiety predictors. There was a significant model, F(4,142) = 16.25, p < 
.001, R2adj= .30, with child social anxiety level (β = .52, p = .001, 95% CI = .04 to 
.11) as the only significant predictor. Thus, the general negative interpretation and 
the specific negative interpretation of the social related scenarios were both best 
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predicted by child social anxiety level. 
Discussion
The results of this study demonstrated that children of PD-parents had the strongest 
specific negative interpretations of panic scenarios compared to the other groups, 
which is an indication of a specific transmission of biased interpretation. However, 
these children also interpreted social scenarios as equally negative (both the general 
and specific negative interpretations) as children of parents with social anxiety, 
indicating that having a parent with a lifetime panic disorder might lead to a broader 
negative interpretation bias. The group of children with SAD-parents showed an 
interpretation bias for the general social interpretations, but did not significantly 
differ from the control group for the specific social interpretations. Priming did not 
affect the negative interpretations of the children. 
The differences between children of parents with a panic disorder and children 
with a socially anxious parent might be related to the finding that panic disorder 
shows a slightly higher familial odds ratio (5.0) compared to phobic disorders 
(4.1; Hettema et al., 2001), indicating a stronger familial transmission risk of panic 
disorder. Furthermore, panic symptoms are very specific and less often experienced 
by children, compared to social anxiety symptoms (Muris, Merckelbach, Gadet, 
& Moulaert, 2000). In fact, social threats and test performance were found to be 
among the most frequent fears and worries of children between 10-12 years old 
(Muris, Merckelbach, et al., 2000). This might explain why the three groups scored 
more similarly on the social scenarios than on the panic scenarios. 
Both level of current parental anxiety and child panic were found to be unique 
predictors for the specific negative panic interpretation, supporting the content-
specificity hypothesis. Regarding the general and specific negative social 
interpretations, only the children's social anxiety symptoms were a unique predictor, 
even though parental anxiety correlated significantly with child negative social 
interpretations. However, since the group of children with SAD-parents was small, 
these results are preliminary and should be replicated in other studies before more 
definite conclusions can be drawn. 
Furthermore, results showed that the child interpretation bias correlated with 
parental anxiety level and the child anxiety level, even though the parent and child 
anxiety levels did not correlate. This differs from a hypothesis formulated by Rapee 
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(2012), who suggested that the relationship between the interpretation biases of 
anxious children and mothers could be explained by the shared heightened anxiety. 
Our findings indicate that even though children's anxiety levels have not developed 
to the same extent as their clinical parents’ levels, and are even similar to the anxiety 
levels of the control group, a cognitive vulnerability can be found. This distorted 
cognitive process might be predictive of the development of anxiety disorders in 
the long term (Hadwin & Field, 2010). These findings extend results from studies 
that have shown that children (and particularly daughters) of depressed mothers 
also display biases in attention, memory and interpretation (Dearing & Gotlib, 
2009; Gotlib, Traill, Montoya, Joormann, & Chang, 2005). This gives a preliminary, 
but consistent view that cognitive biases are of importance in the development of 
several types of disorders in at-risk children. 
Strength and limitations
Strengths of the current study were the inclusion of two clinical parent groups and 
a control group, as well as disorder-specific anxiety measures, so that we were able 
to test for content-specificity, in contrast to most previous studies (e.g. Ooi, Dodd, 
& Walsh, 2015; Orchard et al., 2015). Another strength was the inclusion of specific 
negative interpretations; in the panic scenarios, these were the only interpretations 
with significant differences between groups. 
Several limitations of the current study should also be mentioned. The group 
of parents with social anxiety disorder was relatively small, and this could have 
influenced the regression analysis, since parental social anxiety did relate significantly 
with the general negative social interpretation of the child, but did not prove to be 
a significant predictor of the child’s social interpretation bias. Also, the order of the 
priming and non-priming version of the interpretation task was not counterbalanced, 
and therefore temporal confounds could not be ruled out. However, we chose this 
order because otherwise, the scenarios might still be associated with the prime 
when the non-priming version followed the priming version. Moreover, this order 
is similar to the order used by Schneider et al. (2002), and therefore increases 
comparability of the two studies. Also, it is important to take into account that a 
situation can trigger a variety of anxiety-related cognitions. For instance, we found 
that the only significant predictor of the general panic interpretation was child 
social anxiety. This might be explained by the fact that in hindsight, many of the 
general panic interpretations contained social anxiety triggers. For instance, these 
endings frequently consisted of phrases about feeling unwell in an enclosed, social 
situation. Finally, the current study does not inform how the interpretation biases 
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are transferred from parent to child. Verbal information and threat-related parental 
behaviours are seen as possible pathways by which biases in interpretation might 
transfer (Fisak & Grills-Taquechel, 2007), therefore it is relevant for future research 
to study whether this parental behaviour relates to child interpretations biases, and 
if this is limited to situations relating to the anxiety disorder of the parent. 
Conclusions and implications
The current study supports the expected similarities between child interpretation 
biases and parental anxiety. It provides partial evidence for cross-generational 
content-specificity in interpretation bias of children of anxious parents compared 
to controls, even though anxiety levels were similar. Since research about cognitive 
biases in children of clinical parents is scarce, this research is a valuable addition 
to gain a better understanding of the cognitive factors that are important in the 
intergenerational transmission of anxiety. When further research confirms biases in 
interpretation as a vulnerability factor which predicts anxiety disorders, this will have 
important implications for the preventive treatment of anxiety disorders in children. 
Modifying these biases early in life could possibly prevent the development of 
anxiety disorders, intermitting the cycle of intergenerational transmission.
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Appendix 1.  Example of a panic-related scenario
It is the middle of the night. You suddenly wake up. When you look at the alarm 
clock, you see that it is two o’ clock. You turn over and try to sleep again. Then you 
notice that your heart is racing.
Positive: That’s probably because you go on holiday tomorrow. 
Neutral: You drink some water and try to go back to sleep. 
General negative: You can’t sleep for a while, you toss and turn in your bed.
Specific negative: You also feel faint. You think something bad is happening to you 
and you throw off the cover.
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Chapter5
Non-Anxious Children of Parents with an 
Anxiety Disorder Display Threat-Related 
Associations Specific to their 
Parent's Anxiety
Based on: van Niekerk, R. E., Klein, A. M., Allart-van Dam., Rinck, M., Verbraak, M. 
J. P. M., Hutschemaekers, G. J. M., & Becker, E. S. (2017). Non-anxious children of 
parents	with	an	anxiety	disorder	display	 fear-related	associations	specific	 to	 their	
parent's anxiety. Manuscript submitted for publication.
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Abstract 
Children of anxious parents are at elevated risk for developing an anxiety 
disorder themselves. According to cognitive theories, a possible risk factor is the 
development of clusters of negative threat-related associations, which are seen as 
the basis of maladaptive schemas and biased information processing. The present 
study is the first to investigate whether children of anxious parents display negative 
threat-related associations and whether these threat-related associations relate to 
parental anxiety. A total of 44 children of parents with panic disorder, 27 children of 
parents with social anxiety disorder, and 84 children of parents without an anxiety 
disorder participated in this study. Parents and children filled out the SCARED-71 
and children performed an Affective Priming Task. Results showed that panic-related 
and general anxiety-related associations of the children related to levels of parental 
panic symptoms, which could be first signs of the development of anxiety-related 
schemas. The current level of parental panic symptoms was the only predictor of 
the child’s panic-related and general anxiety-related associations, whereas anxiety 
levels of the child and lifetime diagnosis of the parent did not significantly relate 
to threat-related associations. Our results suggest that negative panic-related 
associations qualify as a possible vulnerability factor for children of parents with an 
anxiety disorder.
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Even though the intergenerational transmission of anxiety disorders has been 
demonstrated in numerous mixed-generations and cross-sectional studies, relatively 
little is known about the mechanisms of transmission of anxiety from parent to child 
(Biederman, Rosenbaum, Bolduc, Faraone, & Hirshfeld, 1991; Creswell et al., 2013; 
Rapee, 2012). Recently, there has been considerable attention for cognitive models of 
transmission of anxiety. These models stress the importance of biases in information 
processing as possible underlying factors in the development of anxiety in families 
(Huijding et al., 2010). For instance, cognitive models propose that parents with 
an anxiety disorder display cognitive structures (schemata) that are biased towards 
threat, such that neutral or ambiguous stimuli are being associated with danger. 
These associations can be seen as “maladaptive lenses that distort the way the world 
is perceived (i.e. disorder-congruent) and are assumed to automatically influence all 
stages of information processing” (Huijding et al., 2010, p. 151). Presumably, these 
maladaptive associations can be transmitted from parent to child via several factors, 
such as inherited vulnerability, adverse life events and lifestyle factors, and learning 
from the parent through modelling and information transfer (see Murray, Creswell, 
& Cooper, 2009, for a review). As a consequence, children of parents with an anxiety 
disorder might be more vulnerable for the development of an anxiety disorder.
While there are several studies that focus on measuring dysfunctional associations 
in anxious adults (Herring, White, Jabeen, Hinojos, & Terrazas, 2013), and there is an 
emerging literature in children (Field, 2006; Klein et al., 2012; Spence et al., 2006), to 
our knowledge, no study has investigated dysfunctional associations as an underlying 
mechanism of intergenerational transmission of anxiety. This is of great importance, 
since several studies have shown that cognitive factors, like interpretation biases, 
can pose a vulnerability for children of anxious parents (Schneider et al., 2002; Van 
Niekerk et al., 2017). It is thus essential from a theoretical and preventive perspective 
to gain more insight into the underlying role of fear- or threat-related associations in 
the transmission of anxiety. Therefore, the main goal of this study was to investigate 
whether children of anxious parents also display these dysfunctional associations 
and whether they are related to their parents’ anxiety. 
To obtain this goal, we used one of the first and most frequently used indirect 
experimental tasks to measure automatic associations: The Affective Priming Task 
(APT; Fazio et al., 1986; Herring et al., 2013). In this task, a prime (word or picture) 
is quickly followed by a target with either a positive or a negative valence. It is 
expected that participants respond more quickly to the target when the prime word 
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has a congruent association with the valence of the target compared to when this 
association is incongruent. For instance, participants will respond faster when the 
word ‘joy’ is followed by a happy face, rather than an anxious face. A recent meta-
analysis found strong support for the finding by Fazio et al. (1986) that prime valence 
influences the speed with which people respond to a valenced target (Herring et 
al., 2013). Moreover, recent studies showed evidence of dysfunctional associations 
in anxious participants, as measured with the APT (Gibbons, 2009; Lange, Allart, 
Keijsers, Rinck, & Becker, 2012). Some studies reported differences between anxious 
and non-anxious individuals (Calvo & Castillo, 2001; Richards & French, 1992), while 
others were unable to find differences (Schniering & Rapee, 1997) or found reverse 
priming effects (Maier, Berner, & Pekrun, 2003). Therefore, more research is needed 
to clarify how anxiety is related to dysfunctional associations.  
Even though the APT is mostly used in adult studies, some recent studies have 
used it in children as well. Its main use has been to measure associations that were 
conditioned beforehand (Field, 2006; Lawson, Banerjee, & Field, 2007). To the best 
of our knowledge, there have only been three studies that focussed specifically on 
measuring dysfunctional associations with the APT in (anxious) children. Spence et 
al. (2006) compared clinically anxious children to non-anxious children on an APT 
with 12 general positive and negative pictures as primes and 12 general positive 
and negative words as targets. The children were asked to categorize the words into 
‘pleasant’ or ‘unpleasant’. Spence and colleagues (2006) found a general priming 
effect for congruent positive prime and target pairs, with children responding 
quicker to a positive target when it was preceded by a positive prime. However, 
they did not find an interaction between anxiety and priming effects, indicating that 
children did not respond differently depending on their level of anxiety. 
One of the potential explanations of the lack of interaction in the study of Spence et 
al. (2006) is that by using general primes and targets, the type of threat stimuli and the 
specific nature of children’s anxiety disorder might not have been properly matched. 
Cognitive theories assume that anxious individuals have negative associations that 
are highly disorder-congruent (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1985; Schniering & Rapee, 
2004), also called content-specificity. For instance, socially anxious individuals are 
assumed to have negative associations for social situations, but not for situations 
related to spiders. General negative words, as used in the Spence et al. (2006) 
study, might not have a stronger negative association in anxious individuals than 
in non-anxious individuals, and might therefore not be specific enough to study 
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anxiety-related associations. 
To obtain a measure of disorder-congruent associations, Klein and colleagues (2012) 
developed an APT including different categories of primes: words related to bodily 
symptoms, negative feelings, happiness, spiders, and general fear. Pictures of 
happy and anxious looking children were used as targets. In this study, the APT was 
used to predict symptoms of spider phobia and spider-related avoidance behaviour. 
Results showed a positive association with the positive words, but not a negative 
association with the fear-related words or an age-dependent effect. In this study, the 
authors found a reversed relation between avoidance behaviour and spider priming 
scores. However, a follow-up study of the same research group found that spider 
priming scores correlated significantly with behavioural avoidance in the expected 
direction (Klein et al., 2017). 
The main goal of the current study was to investigate if children of anxious parents 
display negative threat-related associations. To this end, we first tested whether 
children of parents with an anxiety disorder display stronger negative threat-related 
associations than children of parents without an anxiety disorder. Based on the 
literature about content-specificity (e.g. Schniering & Rapee, 2004), it was expected 
that children of parents with a panic disorder would display the strongest negative 
associations with the panic-related stimuli, followed by children of parents with 
a social anxiety disorder (due to comorbidity between panic disorder and social 
anxiety disorder), followed by children of non-anxious parents (controls). A similarly 
specific pattern was expected for children of parents with a social anxiety disorder for 
the social anxiety-related stimuli. Second, we tested whether there is a relationship 
between the level of anxiety symptoms of the parent (panic; social anxiety) and 
negative associations of the child with the corresponding fear-related words. We 
expected that children of anxious parents would display a negative association with 
the prime words that corresponded with the anxiety symptoms of the parent. For 
instance, we expected that when a parent had a high level of panic symptoms, 
the child would display a strong negative association with panic stimuli. Following 
the content-specificity theory, it was expected that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of anxiety symptoms of the child (panic; social anxiety) and 
negative associations of the child with the corresponding fear-related words. This 
study extends the theory of content-specificity by investigating if specific negative 
associations belonging to a parental anxiety disorder have an impact beyond the 
anxiety-disordered parent.  
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Methods
Participants
The present study was part of a longitudinal study about the intergenerational 
transmission of anxiety (SPRING project; see also Van Niekerk et al., 2017). Three 
groups of children between the ages of 7 and 14 (M = 10.16, SD = 1.58) were 
included in this study: children of parents with a panic disorder with or without 
agoraphobia (PD-parents), children of parents with a social anxiety disorder (SAD-
parents) and children of parents with no anxiety disorder (control-parents).  In the 
groups of children with PD- and SAD-parents, at least one parent had to have the 
target diagnosis. In the control group, neither parent had a lifetime social anxiety 
disorder or panic disorder, or a history of any anxiety disorder during the life of the 
child. Children of PD- and SAD-parents (n = 67) were recruited via the treatment 
facility of the parent and they were included if the parent met the criteria for a 
social anxiety disorder or a panic disorder after the child was born, and if he/she 
was the biological parent of the child. The diagnoses were assessed with MINI 
semi-structured interviews (Vliet, Leroy, & Megen, 2000) by licensed therapists. We 
did not obtain a diagnostic interview of the partner of the anxious parent. Control 
children were recruited via a regular elementary school (n = 69) and connections 
of the authors (n = 26). To rule out the presence of anxiety disorders, the control 
parents were interviewed face-to-face or by telephone with the MINI diagnostic 
interview by trained and supervised master students. Four parents of the recruited 
control children met criteria for a panic disorder or social anxiety disorder during 
the life of their child, and were therefore included in the anxiety group with the 
corresponding diagnosis. Seven children of the control group were excluded after 
data collection at school because the MINI interview with the parent revealed that 
they did not meet the inclusion criteria for the clinical or control groups (e.g., the 
parent did meet the criteria for a panic disorder, but only before their child was 
born, or he/she was not the biological parent of the child). There were 37 children 
of whom a sibling also participated in this study. Parental scores were coupled with 
each of their children.
The final sample consisted of 44 children of parents with panic disorder (with or 
without agoraphobia), 27 children of parents with social anxiety disorder, and 84 
children of parents without any anxiety disorder. There were 7 children whose 
parents met the criteria for both social anxiety and panic disorder. These children 
were not included in the analyses in which groups were split up based on parental 
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diagnosis, but were included in the correlational analyses. 
Child Measures
The Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED-71). This 
questionnaire measures symptoms of the most common anxiety disorders as 
described in the DSM-IV and can be used to differentiate clinically anxious children 
from non-anxious children (Bodden et al., 2009). It measures frequency of anxiety 
symptoms on a 3-point Likert scale (0 = almost never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = often) 
and results are displayed in subscales per anxiety disorder and in a total score. The 
SCARED-71 has excellent internal consistency (Cronbach's α = .95; Bodden et al., 
2009). Internal consistency in the present study was also excellent (α = .94). 
Affective Priming Task. The affective priming task (APT) that was used in this 
study was very similar to the one used by Klein et al. (2012). The task consisted of 
prime words and pictorial targets. There were two versions of the task with similar 
counterbalanced prime words, which belonged to five different categories (three 
words per category): panic-related symptoms (e.g. dizzy, suffocating), social anxiety-
related (e.g. loser, shame), spider-related (spider, web), general anxiety-related (e.g. 
anxious, scared) and positive-related (e.g. happy, fantastic). The target stimuli were 
pictures of faces of children (three boys, three girls) that looked either happy or 
fearful. The children were instructed to first look at a fixation cross that was presented 
in the middle of the screen. When the prime replaced the cross, the children were 
asked to look at the prime, but to ignore it when categorizing the subsequent target 
stimulus. The prime word was presented for 300 ms, after which the target face 
was presented until the children reacted by pressing a key. The children had to 
evaluate the pictures as either positive or negative as fast as possible by pushing 
either the happy key (marked with a happy smiley) or the fearful key (marked with 
an unhappy smiley) on the keyboard. The key positions were counterbalanced 
across the sample, and the pictures of the faces were shown in random order. The 
reaction time between the presentation of the target face and the response was 
measured. The task consisted of ten practise trials, followed by 180 trials divided 
into six blocks. Children could take short self-paced breaks between the blocks. 
While the APT was administered, the experimenter did not know the children’s self-
reported levels of anxiety. Since the spider-related category was not relevant for our 
research goals, this category was not analysed in this study. 
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Parental Measures
The Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders (SCARED-A). The 
SCARED-A is the adult version of the SCARED-71, and it was used to measure 
parental anxiety (Bögels & van Melick, 2004). The SCARED-A is able to discriminate 
participants with and without a current anxiety disorder (Van Steensel & Bögels, 
2014). Internal consistency for the total score for both mothers and fathers is 
excellent (α > .90; Bögels & van Melick, 2004; Van Steensel & Bögels, 2014). Internal 
consistency of the subscales is also reported to be good α = .88 for the social 
anxiety subscale and α = .85 for the panic subscale; Van Steensel & Bögels, 2014). 
The adult version is similar to the child version, which makes the scores comparable. 
Internal consistency of the total score of the SCARED-A in the current study was 
excellent (α = .96). 
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI plus version 5.0.0). The MINI 
is a brief, systematic interview designed to identify Axis I psychiatric disorders in the 
DSM-IV and ICD-10 (Vliet et al., 2000). The psychometric properties are found to 
be good, with acceptably high validity and reliability scores (Lecrubier et al., 1997; 
Sheehan et al., 1997). In this study, the sections on panic disorder, agoraphobia, 
social anxiety disorder, and specific phobia were used. 
Procedure 
Parents and children received detailed information about the project. Written 
informed consent was obtained from the parents and also from the child when the 
child was aged 12 years or older. As the current study was part of a broader research 
project about biases in children, other cognitive bias tasks and questionnaires were 
administered as well (see also Van Niekerk et al., 2017). A full list of materials and 
tasks is available from the corresponding author. Data collection was divided into 
two sessions of three hours each for the children, and one hour per child for the 
anxious parent or for one of the control parents. The other parent was asked to fill 
out two questionnaires. Testing took place either at the participant’s house, at the 
participating elementary school, or at Radboud University, Nijmegen. When the 
children were seen at home, they were tested in a specially equipped van to create 
a quiet testing environment. Trained master students of Clinical Psychology tested 
the children.
Data Preparation
For the APT, the average number of mistakes was 7.1% (range 6.9% - 7.3% across 
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categories), which was similar to Klein et al. (2012). Incorrect trials and trials with 
extreme reaction times (300 ms < RT > 3 SD = 4584 ms) were deleted. Children 
(n = 14) with more than 20% incorrect trials were excluded from the analyses. 
Priming scores per negative word category (panic, social, spider, general anxiety) 
were calculated by comparing RTs for these words to those for positive words. For 
instance, the panic score was computed as follows: priming score panic = (RT panic 
prime & positive target + RT positive prime & negative target) - (RT panic prime 
& negative target + RT positive prime & positive target). The calculation of this 
difference score also corrects for the general reaction speed of a child. The total 
priming score for children with negative panic associations will be higher than for 
children without negative panic associations, because children with a negative panic 
association will be slower in first part of the equation due to the combination of the 
panic target with a positive prime, but quicker in the second part, due to the pairing 
of panic prime and negative target. 
Results
Descriptives and anxiety levels
We performed six ANOVAs (separately for child- and parental anxiety scores) with 
group as independent variable and child/parental SCARED total, panic and social 
anxiety scores as dependent variables, to test if there were significant differences 
between the three groups on child and/or parental anxiety scores (see Table 1 for 
an overview of all results). The three child groups did not differ significantly from 
each other in total anxiety scores, F(2,149) = .33, p = .72, η2 = .004, panic scores 
F(2,151) = 1.32, p = .27, η2 = .02 and social anxiety scores F(2,151) = 1.73, p = .18, 
η2 = .02. Furthermore, the mean sum scores did not cross the clinical cut-off of 30 
for the SCARED total score and the cut-offs of 8 for the SCARED subscales for any 
of the three groups. Furthermore, the child groups did not differ significantly in 
age, F(2,152) = .13, p = .88, or in gender, X2(3) = 1.13, p = .770. The three parent 
groups differed significantly in accordance with their diagnosis, in total anxiety 
scores F(2,137) = 46.35, p < .001, η2 = .40, panic scores F(2,137) = 73.94, p < .001, 
η2 = .52 and social anxiety scores F(2,137) = 52.46, p < .001, η2 = .43. There were 
no significant differences between groups for parental gender, X2(2) = 1.99, p = .37. 
108
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Child and Parental Anxiety Scores.
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses next to means. The group of children of parents with both PD and 
SAD did not include enough participants for comparison to the other groups. 
* p < .05, ** p < .001. Means with different superscripts within rows are significantly different based on Holm-Bonferroni 
post-hoc paired comparisons.
Priming effects related to parental diagnosis
The first research goal was to investigate whether children of parents with an anxiety 
disorder display stronger negative threat-related associations compared to children 
of parents without an anxiety disorder. We performed a MANOVA with the children 
split up by parental diagnosis as between-subjects factor and the four priming 
scores of the APT (panic, social, spider, general anxiety) as dependent variables. 
Although the means displayed in Table 2 showed the expected pattern, we did not 
find significant differences between the groups on the four priming scores, F(8,276) 
= .69, p = .70,η2 = .02. This means that the groups did not significantly differ in how                          p
they evaluated the primes in the APT. 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Priming Scores per Group
Specificity of Associations in Relation to Parental and Child Anxiety 
The second research goal was to test whether there is a relationship between the level 
of parental and child panic or social anxiety symptoms and negative associations 
of the child with the corresponding prime score (panic or social anxiety). First, we 
calculated correlations of the priming scores (panic, social, spider, general anxiety) 
with parental and child panic and social anxiety levels for the children of anxious 
parents (see Table 3). Results showed a specific relationship between the level of 
panic symptoms of the parent and the priming score of the child: panic symptoms 
of the parent correlated significantly with the panic priming score and the general 
fear priming score, but not with the other priming scores. The higher the panic 
symptoms of the parent, the stronger the negative associations of the child with 
panic primes, r = .33, p = .007, and with general anxiety-related primes, r =.28, p 
= .02. We did not find a significant specific relationship between the social anxiety 
symptoms of the parent or child and the social-anxiety related associations of the 
child, r = .20, p = .12. The social anxiety related priming score was not significantly 
related to other anxiety measurements. 
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Table 3. Correlations of Priming Scores and Anxiety Levels
Note: Correlations are bootstrapped with 5000 samples. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed); n = 66
Second, we performed two regression analyses to further investigate the relationship 
between parental and child anxiety levels and the negative associations of the child. 
In the first analysis, we predicted panic-related priming scores with parental and 
child panic levels and social anxiety levels as predictors for the group of children 
with parents with an anxiety disorder. Table 4 displays the results. The model with 
the four predictors was significant, F(4,63) = 2.60, p = .04, R2adj = .09, with parental 
panic levels as the only significant predictor (β = .34, p = .01). This indicates that in 
the group of children with an anxious parent, children’s negative associations with 
panic-related stimuli were specifically related to the level of panic symptoms of their 
parent. The second analysis with social-related priming scores as predicted variable, 
and parental and child social anxiety and panic levels as predictors did not yield 
significant results, F(4,63) = 1.09, p = .37, R2adj = .005. This means that the children’s 
social-related priming score was not related to their own or their parents’ level of 
panic or social anxiety. 
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Table 4. Linear Regression Coefficients of the Relation between Parental and Child Anxiety and Priming Scores. 
Note. CI and p values are bootstrapped with 5000 samples.
* p < .05
Discussion
Despite a growing literature demonstrating that children of anxious parents are at 
elevated risk for developing an anxiety disorder (Biederman et al., 2006), relatively 
little is known about the factors and mechanisms that underlie this heightened risk. 
This study is the first to investigate whether threat-related associations of children of 
parents with an anxiety disorder are a possible risk factor. The first research goal was 
to test whether children of parents with an anxiety disorder display stronger negative 
threat-related associations than children of parents without an anxiety disorder. We 
hypothesized that children of PD-parents have negative associations with panic-
related words and children of SAD-parents have negative associations with social-
anxiety related words. Contrary to our expectations, results showed that there was 
no significant relationship between parental diagnosis and negative associations of 
the child. This indicates that children of PD-parents and SAD-parents did not show 
more negative associations with fear-related words than children of control-parents. 
The second research goal was to investigate whether there is a relationship 
between the level of anxiety symptoms of the parent (panic; social anxiety) and 
negative associations of the child with the corresponding fear-related words. As 
expected, results showed a content-specific relationship between parental anxiety 
symptoms and child anxiety-related associations: when parents experienced more 
panic symptoms, children showed stronger negative associations with panic-related 
words and general anxiety-related words. Since panic disorder encompasses the 
fear for the physical sensations of anxiety, it is fitting that level of parental panic 
relates to both negative associations of children with panic-related words and 
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general anxiety words. Results also showed that parental panic symptoms were the 
only predictor of negative panic associations in the child; child anxiety symptoms 
did not predict these associations. We did not find a similar relationship for social 
anxiety symptoms of the parent and social anxiety-related associations of the child. 
This could be explained by the fact that the group of parents with a social anxiety 
disorder was relatively small, which could have precluded the detection of smaller 
correlations. Since we included parents with a lifetime panic disorder and/or social 
anxiety disorder, it is possible that at the time of testing they had fewer symptoms 
than when they were in the midst of their anxiety disorder. Our findings indicate 
that the level of anxiety symptoms might be more important for the development of 
negative associations in children than the lifetime presence of an anxiety disorder. It 
is possible that with the use of these bias measures, a risk factor can be found which 
can later relate to increased chances to develop an anxiety disorder. This could 
mean that giving parents successful therapy might lower the risk of their children to 
develop negative associations with physical symptoms or social situations, thereby 
decreasing their vulnerability for developing an anxiety disorder. Hopefully, future 
research will shed a light on whether a reduction in parental anxiety affects the risk 
of children to develop threat-related associations. 
Previous studies investigating threat-related associations in children have had 
mixed success in finding a relationship between child-reported anxiety and threat-
related associations (Klein et al., 2017; Spence et al., 2006). However, when these 
associations were found, they predicted behavioural avoidance over and above 
child-reported anxiety (Klein et al., 2017). The finding that automatic associations 
relate to avoidance behaviour corresponds with the Reflective Impulsive Model 
developed by Strack and Deutsch (2004), which distinguishes an impulsive system, 
which guides behaviour based on automatic activation of associative networks, from 
a reflective system, which uses higher-order mental operations like logical reasoning. 
Since our study found a relationship between child threat-related associations and 
parental anxiety, but not child anxiety, this might indicate that child threat-related 
associations are active at an automatic level, being subconsciously influenced by 
parental anxiety. Since previous studies showed that trained negative associations 
can remain up to 6 months later (Field, Lawson, & Banerjee, 2008), the negative 
associations found in the current study might have a long-term effect. Children of 
parents with panic symptoms might not experience more anxiety, but already seem 
to be negatively primed towards anxiety-related materials, which in turn might lead 
to automatic avoidance behaviour later on. This corresponds with findings by Van 
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Niekerk et al. (2017), showing that children of anxious parents display biases in 
interpretation related to their parents’ panic disorder. Similar findings in the field of 
depression research demonstrate that parental depression and biased information 
processes in their children are related (Gotlib, Traill, Montoya, Joormann, & Chang, 
2005; Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; Kujawa et al., 2011). Together, these findings 
support cognitive models of intergenerational transmission of psychopathology, 
and emphasize the importance of focussing on biased information processes in at-
risk families (Huijding et al., 2010). 
One of the major strengths of this study was the use of several specific priming 
categories in the affective priming task. This made it possible to find specific 
relationships, and it strengthens the hypothesis that specific biases can be 
transmitted, depending on the level of anxiety of the parent. However, a number 
of limitations should also be pointed out. First, reaction time based tasks are found 
to be less reliable than questionnaires (Brown et al., 2014), although some positive 
results regarding sensitivity and predictive validity were reported (Huijding & de 
Jong, 2005). Tasks focusing on automatic associations add valuable information, but 
it is possible that these findings are not easily replicated. Since this is the first study 
about child threat-related associations that also takes parental anxiety into account, 
it is important that this study is being replicated, so more definite conclusions can 
be drawn. Also, when techniques of measuring threat-related associations improve, 
then these measurements could be a useful addition to methods of early detection 
of at-risk children. Second, we did not have a measurement of the diagnoses of the 
partner of the anxious parent. This is similar to the study of Joormann et al. (2007), 
who studied the daughters of mothers with a history of depression. However, it 
would have been a valuable addition to have the diagnostic information of the 
partners. Third, this study is cross-sectional and does not inform us about the long-
term consequences and stability of these threat-related associations. 
Taken together, the present results provide support for cognitive models of anxiety 
by showing that high-risk children display negative automatic threat-related 
associations with are related to their parents’, but not their own levels of anxiety. 
The critical questions that remain are whether these negative associations predict 
the onset of anxiety disorders in this high-risk group and how these negative 
associations are transmitted from parent to child. Future studies investigating 
the predictive value of information processing biases and mechanisms of the 
intergenerational transmission of anxiety are clearly needed and are of great value 
for early interventions aimed at the prevention of anxiety disorders. 
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Chapter6
General Discussion 
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This dissertation aimed to advance the field of developmental psychopathology 
by focusing on vulnerability factors for anxiety and anxiety disorders in children. 
More specifically, the research described investigated several cognitive phenomena 
that relate to threat schemata, i.e. threat- or fear-related associations and thoughts, 
biased attention, interpretation and memory processes and the relationship of these 
phenomena to child behaviour. These cognitive processes were also examined in the 
family perspective by relating the child’s cognitive biases to the specific diagnosis 
of a clinically anxious parent. In other words, I looked for relationships among the 
child’s biased information processing, anxiety levels and fear-related behaviours 
and explored the role of cognitive biases in the intergenerational transmission of 
anxiety.
The dissertation contains four studies: (1) a study examining the role of childhood 
social threat thoughts in relation to state and trait anxiety and behaviour, (2) a study 
examining the relationship between several child cognitive biases and avoidance 
behaviour, (3) a study examining the intergenerational transmission of interpretation 
biases in children of clinically anxious parents, and (4) a study examining the 
intergenerational transmission of threat-related associations in children of clinically 
anxious parents. The current, final chapter provides a summary of the main results 
of these studies reported in Chapters 2 to 5 and integrates and discusses the 
implications of the various findings. The chapter ends with several suggestions for 
further research and some concluding remarks.
Summary and results of the separate studies
Study 1 
The first study (presented in Chapter 2) examined whether distorted cognitive 
processes as described in the cognitive model of social anxiety (Hofmann, 2007) 
are also present in children by addressing children’s negative thoughts about their 
own social performance and the negative reactions of others. Children with varying 
levels of social anxiety were asked to perform a social speech task in which they 
were invited to tell something about themselves for two minutes. The study focused 
on whether their fears of being rejected by others (social threat thoughts) and their 
thoughts about their own social skills (social skill perception) would be associated 
with their anxiety levels and whether these would be indicative of a social skills 
deficit. We measured two types of anxiety: (1) state anxiety in terms of anxiety 
levels before and after the speech task and (2) trait social anxiety operationalized as 
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anxiety scores for social situations in general. Controlling for baseline state anxiety, 
we found that only social threat thoughts mediated the relationship between trait 
social anxiety and state anxiety after the speech task, indicating that social threat 
thoughts contributed to the children’s state anxiety in our particular social-evaluative 
situation. Second, although the children who showed a higher trait anxiety tended 
to underestimate their social skills, they did not show a social skills deficit. The 
increase in anxiety in the social speech condition was partly explained by the fear 
of being rejected by others, adding to the evidence of the importance of threat-
related cognitions in anxiety processes in children (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 
2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).
Study 2
The second study (described in Chapter 3) investigated the relationship between 
threat-related associations, attentional bias, interpretation bias, memory bias and 
behaviour in spider-fearful children. The main goal of this study was to investigate 
how these biases relate to each other and whether they would independently predict 
spider-specific avoidance behaviour. We not only sought to replicate earlier studies 
on spider attention bias but also to test a dedicated interpretation task in which 
children are asked to estimate the size of a spider and the distance between them 
and its transparent cage. The results revealed that children with a fear of spiders 
showed both an attentional and an interpretation bias, as well as threat associations 
for spider-related stimuli. A memory bias was not found. The spider interpretation 
task was effective in predicting unique variance in behavioural avoidance above and 
beyond the variance predicted by other cognitive bias measures and self-reported 
fear. As the bias measures only weakly correlated with each other, this could 
indicate that they represent distinct cognitive processes. Interestingly, attention, 
interpretation and threat-related associations all predicted unique variance in fear-
related avoidance behaviour, which suggests that fearful children have an extended 
array of cognitive biases that each seem to measure distinctive aspects of fear-
induced avoidance.  
Study 3
The third study (included in Chapter 4) investigated the intergenerational 
transmission of interpretation bias. Comparing children of parents with a panic 
disorder and/or social anxiety disorder with a control group of children with parents 
without a history of anxiety disorders, our first goal was to determine whether 
interpretation processes in the children of clinically anxious parents would be more 
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biased. One of the hypotheses was that priming might be necessary to find an 
interpretation bias in children with subclinical levels of anxiety. Our second goal was 
to test whether there is a relationship between the interpretation biases observed 
and the severity of panic or social-anxiety symptoms of the parent and/or the child 
and whether this relationship would be content-specific. We found that, although 
anxiety levels did not significantly differ between the groups, the interpretations the 
children of parents with a panic disorder gave of panic and social scenarios were 
significantly more negative than the interpretations of the controls. Rather than 
having a specific negative focus, the interpretations of the social scenarios provided 
by the children of parents with a social anxiety disorder had a more general negative 
nature. Contrary to Schneider et al. (2002), we found that priming did not affect the 
children’s interpretations. Not only the child’s own panic level but also that of the 
parent was relevant in the prediction of the child’s panic interpretation bias, while 
only the child’s social anxiety levels predicted the extent of its social interpretation 
bias. The current level of parental anxiety appeared to be a more content-specific 
predictor of the child’s interpretation bias than its parent’s diagnosis. Our findings 
thus demonstrated that the interpretation biases we found in children of clinically 
anxious parents were related to their parents’ anxiety, which is an interesting 
addition to the existing literature, underscoring the importance of investigating 
links between parental and child anxiety. 
Study 4
The fourth study (Chapter 5) followed up on study 3 and was the first to investigate 
whether children of highly anxious parents display more negative threat-related 
associations than children of parents without an anxiety disorder and whether these 
associations were related to parental anxiety, more specifically whether the severity 
of the panic or social anxiety symptoms of the parent and/or child correlated and 
whether this correlation was content-specific. We indeed found a significant and 
content-specific relationship between the children’s panic-related and general 
anxiety-related associations and the level of parental panic: when a parent showed 
more severe panic symptoms, the child showed stronger negative associations with 
panic and general fear-related words. The child’s anxiety levels and parental lifetime 
diagnosis did not significantly relate to any of the child’s threat-related associations, 
nor did we find evidence of a relationship between child and parental social anxiety 
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associations and social anxiety. By showing that high-risk children display negative 
automatic threat associations that are related to their parents’ but not their own 
panic symptoms, our findings provide support for cognitive models of anxiety.
The main findings of studies 1 and 2 in perspective
The relationship between children’s biased cognitive processing, anxiety levels 
and fear-related behaviour
Anxiety is a multifaceted emotion and generally very useful for protecting individuals 
from threat and harm. At the same time, humans have developed such complex 
cognitive processing capabilities that they can also give rise to complex anxiety-
related problems. With the research described in this dissertation we have shown 
that, even though no actual threat is present, children can process a situation as 
though something threatening has happened or is about to happen. We could link 
our findings of such biased cognitive processing to the model proposed by Beck 
and Clark (1997) that differentiates between controlled and automatic cognitive 
processes. We found evidence that the more controlled processes (e.g. thoughts 
and evaluations) can partially predict anxiety levels in children. We, for instance, 
observed that biased social-threat cognitions predicted their anxiety after a socially 
challenging (speech) task. These negative thoughts were also related to the negative 
interpretations these children gave to their task performance. In line with other 
studies that identified a specific negatively biased cognitive processing style in 
socially anxious children (Ferreri et al., 2011), our findings show how threat-related 
schemas can colour high-anxious children’s interpretations of a social situation and 
that they can be indicative of how these schemes might intensify their anticipation 
anxiety in similar future situations (Hofmann, 2007).  
In addition to the biased way in which they process self-related information, we also 
found evidence that anxious children display (more automatic) biases in attention 
and interpretation to the point that these biases uniquely predicted anxiety levels 
and anxiety-related behaviour. This is consistent with cognitive models that suggest 
that the various cognitive biases may work additively to predict anxiety (Weems & 
Watts, 2005). 
Besides the subdivision of controlled and automatic processes, information 
processing can also be divided into different stages, as Daleiden and Vasey (1997) 
do in their theory in which they distinguish encoding, interpreting, goal clarification, 
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response access, response selection and enactment as separate stages. Our 
studies, however, showed that these stages might not necessarily be so separate. 
Employing an interpretation task in which children had to estimate the size of 
and their distance to a spider and an ambiguous scenario task to assess biases in 
social and panic situations, we gauged interpretation biases in the more automatic 
encoding stage (perception of a spider) and in the more controlled interpretation 
stage (interpretation of stories). We found that the two tasks were both effective 
in demonstrating content-specific interpretation biases. Interpretation biases can 
then be found in different stages of cognitive processing. Even though our studies 
do not conclusively show which stages of cognitive processing the tasks we used 
tap into, they do show that interpretation biases have automatic and controlled 
components that can occur both in the encoding and in the interpretation stage. 
Models that do not use strictly separated stages of biased cognitive processing, 
like the model developed by Klein (2016), then have a better fit with our outcomes. 
In sum, we found that socially anxious children have social-threat biases after a 
speech task and that these cognitions partly predicted the level of state anxiety 
and the extent to which the children underestimated their performance. In addition, 
children showed threat associations and interpretation and attentional biases (but 
no memory bias) that coincided with the nature and level of their anxiety and 
anxiety behaviours, which content specificity was observed for social anxiety, panic 
and spider anxiety. Also, these findings fit in best with a model in which automatic 
and controlled processes are regarded as partly overlapping rather than as strictly 
separated. 
Expanding current child anxiety models 
 As shown and discussed on page 16 of the introduction chapter, in her model that 
she developed based on the theories of Daleiden and Vasey (1997) and Muris and 
Field (2008), Klein (2016) shows how anxiety-related biased cognitive processing 
evolves as well as the extent to which these processes are automatic or controlled. 
Next, I will adapt the model to incorporate recent cognitive theories about schemas 
and conditioning, differentiating between unbiased and biased processing and the 
effect on anxiety development. This adapted model is shown in Figure 1. Further 
on in this chapter, I will extend the model further to also incorporate our current 
findings that show the potential role of cognitive biases in the intergenerational 
transmission of anxiety. This expanded model is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1. The adapted information-processing model of childhood anxiety describing the role of biased cognitive 
processes in the processing of threat-related information.
Starting from the model proposed by Klein (2016), the model depicted in Figure 
1 incorporates the cognitive bias model of Watts and Weems (2006) and the 
conditioning paradigm of Bouton (1993), which was further developed by Craske 
and colleagues (2014). Following the inhibitory learning model of Bouton (1993) 
and also the cognitive model of Beck and Clark (1997), in this adapted model 
threat-related schemas and threat-related associations are awarded different roles 
than Klein (2016).
According to Bouton (1993), threat associations are learned in a conditioning 
process. Thus, when a child is bitten by a dog, it learns that dogs can be dangerous. 
Still, when it sees people playing with their dogs, the child will also learn that not all 
dogs are dangerous. Whether these contradicting experiences instil a fear of dogs 
in the child depends on whether either the threat/fear association or the neutral 
association is reinforced and the context, which might either trigger the threat/
fear or a neutral association. Continuing the dog example, when different threat 
associations involving dogs are strongly reinforced, the child may develop a dog-
specific or more generalized animal threat schema (Beck & Haigh, 2014). In biased 
cognitive processing, both the dog-threat associations and the dog-threat schemas 
are essential. Since threat-related schemas can already be seen as a filter through 
which relevant information is categorized (Beck & Clark, 1997; Huijding et al., 2010), 
in the model depicted in Figure 1 I did not incorporate the separate ‘filter’ that Klein 
(2016). How strongly certain stimuli will be associated with threat will differ per child, 
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depending, amongst other factors, on their learning history, anxiety sensitivity and 
personality traits. This adapted model accordingly gives a schematic overview of 
the role threat-related associations and cognitive biases play when children need to 
process threat-related information. 
Following the model (Figure 1), when a child encounters a situation or stimulus, 
it depends on the relevant threat-related schemas the child has developed 
whether it will perceive the situation as relevant for further processing or not. All 
children will have learned that some stimuli are dangerous (e.g. wild animals) but 
for many ambiguous stimuli the conclusion will depend on their personal learning 
experiences. When an ambiguous situation is quickly evaluated as being potentially 
dangerous, it depends on the context whether threat-related associations or neutral 
associations will be activated in the child. Contextual factors can be the presence of 
a parent or a large distance between the child and the potential threat. Activation 
of the child’s threat-related associations will bias its information processing towards 
the perceived threat (Huijding et al., 2010). In Figure 1, these cognitive biases are 
depicted in the grey area in the order in which they are thought to be automatic or 
(more) controlled. In anxious children, attentional biases tend to be characterized 
by a pattern of initial vigilance for threat, followed by avoidance of sustained 
processing of the threat in order to reduce anxiety (Mogg et al., 1997). Interpretation 
biases are then characterized by their tendency to perceive ambiguous situations 
as threatening, while memory biases refer to their propensity to selectively recall 
negative information related to themselves or past situations. When the child 
processes the information based on negative biases, it will arrive at the conclusion 
that the stimulus is indeed dangerous, which will intensify its initial anxiety. This 
clearly is problematic when the child processes ambiguous stimuli that pose no true 
threat as being dangerous due to these biases. The negative conclusion will then 
increase the strength of the anxious child’s threat associations in its threat-related 
schema. 
Case example of the model
The model shows how cognitive biases can help explain how a negative experience 
can start a vicious cycle that can lead to trait anxiety or develop into an anxiety 
disorder. I will next illustrate the model with a case example. Eva, an 8-year old 
girl, has to answer a question in class. She makes a mistake and some children 
start laughing, which distresses her, making her feel anxious and ashamed. This 
experience may condition Eva to think that mistakes are negative and shameful. 
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The specific threat association is stored in her memory and may form the beginning 
of a threat schema. The next time Eva has to perform a task in class or another 
public setting, these threat associations can be activated, depending on the 
particulars of the context (e.g. whether the same children are present). If activated, 
her attention will be drawn towards the potential threat or they induce her to avoid 
threat signals. Eva may, for instance, anxiously scan the (class)room for children 
that are laughing or she may avoid eye contact; either way, she will not be able to 
detect and incorporate new and possibly non-threatening information. Her threat-
related associations may bias her interpretation of the situation at other levels as 
well: she might perceive neutral facial expressions as disapproving or see success 
as failure. She may also interpret bodily sensations as a signal that something is 
wrong: feeling ashamed and anxious, her face is turning red, driving Eva to think of 
a reason for these sensations. This will trigger her memory of the earlier experience 
where she perceived the actions of her classmates to be negative evaluations of her 
performance, which will fuel her anxiety and the budging desire to quickly leave 
the situation, potentially creating a tendency in her to avoid similar situations in 
the future. Since Eva experienced all these negative emotions the second time she 
had to perform in public, this second event is also stored in her memory with a 
high, negative emotional load, which will condition her even more into thinking that 
mistakes are negative and shameful, reinforcing her threat associations and thereby 
the strength of her threat schema.
If the teacher or a parent had told Eva that mistakes are fine (a contextual factor) 
and had pointed out that most of her classmates were not laughing at her, this could 
have helped her to develop a neutral association: mistakes are ok. The threat would 
then have been defused, turning the event into a neutral or even positive learning 
experience, thereby preventing or diminishing her biased cognitive processing. 
This ‘inhibitory learning process’ is also the proposed working mechanism behind 
exposure therapy for anxiety disorders (Craske et al., 2014). According to these 
theories, it depends on the learning experiences, but also the context, which 
association is activated.
The child anxiety model in relation to findings in the literature
Some of the mixed findings of previous studies on child anxiety can be explained 
with our model. It has proven difficult to consistently find cognitive biases in children, 
especially in subclinically anxious children. This can, of course, be explained by the 
difficulty children have to stay concentrated during reaction-time tasks and also 
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by the different stages of cognitive development they are in, which can influence 
their responses (Hadwin & Field, 2010a). However, our model can explain these 
inconsistent results by claiming that, at the time of testing, children with heightened 
anxiety levels might not yet have developed strong threat schemata, which is why, 
depending on the context, either mild threat-related or neutral associations can be 
activated. It is therefore crucial that in cognitive-bias tasks cues create a ‘true’ sense 
of threat to thus activate the child’s existing threat-related associations, which might 
not always be the case in the current research material. Priming is an option, but if 
the task prompts are already effective in triggering biased processing (as was shown 
in our study described in Chapter 4), priming is redundant. 
Furthermore, not all biases are equally strongly related to anxiety. In the studies 
reported in this dissertation, we did not find any evidence of a memory bias that 
was associated with anxiety. Memory biases seem to be less characteristic of 
anxiety symptomatology and are more frequently found in children with depressive 
symptoms (Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000; Weems & Watts, 2005). Possibly, rather than 
remembering situations in a negative way (e.g. recalling the presence of a spider 
even when it was shown that there was no spider), anxious children will remember 
the feelings of threat and anxiety that were triggered by the situation (e.g. seeing 
a cobweb), where the recollection of these emotions will reinforce their threat 
association regardless of what really happened. 
To recapitulate, the first two studies provided evidence of a link between anxiety and 
both automatic and controlled biased processing in anxious children. Combined 
with other cognitive theories, the findings inspired us to extend an existing cognitive 
model (Klein, 216) to allow for the links between cognitive biases and anxiety. 
This expanded model now integrates both biased and unbiased processing while 
emphasizing the role of threat-related schemas in the progression and maintenance 
of pathological anxiety. 
The main findings of studies 3 and 4 in perspective
The role of cognitive biases in the intergenerational transmission of anxiety
The second part of this dissertation focused on the intergenerational transmission 
of anxiety. Anxiety ‘runs in the family’, with a high percentage of children of anxious 
parents being vulnerable to develop an anxiety disorder (Beidel & Turner, 1997). In 
two studies I investigated whether biased cognitive processing in parents qualifies 
129
as such a vulnerability factor by looking at two frequent anxiety disorders: parental 
panic disorder and social anxiety disorder. The results revealed relevant links 
between the anxiety disorder of the parent and the cognitive biases of the child. We 
found evidence to suggest that the biased interpretations of children of parents with 
an anxiety disorder are content-specific in that the children of parents with a panic 
disorder showed a stronger negative interpretation for panic scenarios than age 
peers whose parents had a social anxiety disorder or no known psychopathology. 
For the children with a parent with a social anxiety disorder this relationship was 
less clear: although they showed a general negative interpretation bias for social 
scenarios, the children of the panic-disordered parents scored higher on the specific 
negative social interpretation bias (specific anxiety-related cognitions). Our findings 
are in line with a previous study that also showed an interpretation bias in children 
of parents with a panic disorder (Schneider et al., 2002). However, in contrast to this 
study, our study showed that priming was not necessary to find the interpretation 
bias in subclinically anxious children. 
Our studies did not show a relationship between the parental diagnosis and the 
threat-related associations of the child. For the child to display such associations, 
the parent’s level of anxiety was more important than his/her life-time diagnosis, 
with only the level of self-reported parental panic symptoms showing a significant 
content-specific relationship with the children’s panic-related associations and 
general threat associations. No such links were found for the children’s social-anxiety 
associations and parental levels of social anxiety. 
Integrating parental anxiety in the childhood anxiety model
With our studies we were the first to investigate content-specific relationships 
between parental panic disorder and parental social anxiety disorder and the 
cognitive biases in the child. Interestingly, the results showed that the child’s 
interpretation biases were related to both its own and the parent’s anxiety, while 
its panic-related associations only correlated significantly with the parent’s panic 
level. When we look at the adapted model of childhood anxiety (Figure 1), it is 
possible that children of parents with diagnosed panic or social-anxiety symptoms 
acquire their threat associations from their parents. Even though the children may 
not (yet) show clinically elevated levels of anxiety, this learned behaviour may lay 
the foundation for more negative associations with certain situations and feelings 
130
that may develop into trait panic and anxiety and eventually into a panic or anxiety 
disorder similar to the parent’s diagnosis. Arguably, since interpretation is a more 
controlled cognitive process, children might become more aware of their feelings 
regarding these specific kinds of panic situations, which would then explain 
the significant correlation we observed between their anxiety levels and their 
interpretations of the ambiguous scenarios. 
In Figure 2, these relationships between parental and child anxiety have been 
added to the model, which now graphically depicts the findings of the studies 
reported in this dissertation while also integrating other possible pathways by which 
parental anxiety can interact with child cognitive processing, potentially causing it to 
develop content-specific biases and schemas (e.g. Lebowitz, Leckman, Silverman, 
& Feldman, 2016). 
Figure 2. The adapted information-processing model of childhood anxiety describing the role parental anxiety in 
threat-related cognitive processing. 
There are several ways by which parental anxiety can affect child cognitive processing. 
We investigated two of such mechanisms: the relationship between parental anxiety 
and child threat associations and parental anxiety and child interpretation biases. 
Research has shown that parents with an anxiety disorder have developed threat 
schemas that represent threat associations that are related to their type of disorder 
(Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009; Voncken, Bögels, & Peeters, 2007). The results 
of our research showed that the child’s panic associations indeed related to its 
131
parent’s panic symptoms. Therefore, I have connected parental anxiety directly with 
threat-related associations of the child in the model, which now also shows a direct 
link between parental anxiety and child interpretation bias. Since the only study 
investigating attention biases in children of parents with a panic disorder did not 
yield significant results (Schneider et al., 2008), the relationships between parental 
anxiety and child attentional and memory biases still has to be explored. 
Summarizing, based on the findings presented in this dissertation and other 
findings from child literature, the proposed model explains how parental anxiety 
can trigger the child to develop cognitive biases while conceptualizing several 
pathways that can be relevant for the intergenerational transmission of anxiety. 
The model can also be used to incorporate other findings from previous literature 
and serve as an inspiration to investigate new pathways by which parents can 
bias information processing in their children, for instance by comparing parental 
behaviours that create either a safe or a threatening context  (Mumme et al., 1996; 
Muris et al., 1996) or by looking for genetic influences (Shimada–Sugimoto et al., 
2015) and the sensitivity for learning threat-related associations (Craske, Hermans, 
& Vansteenwegen, 2006). 
Limitations and future research recommendations
Up to this point, I have provided a summary of the results and the theoretical 
implications of the findings reported in this dissertation. However, some 
methodological limitations need to be mentioned as well. Since the more specific 
limitations have been discussed per study, in this section I will address some general 
limitations of the research conducted. 
First, the studies described in this dissertation were inconsistent as to whether the 
cognitive bias measures we used correlated with each other, while the correlations 
for the outcomes on the cognitive bias, self-report and behavioural measures were 
mainly low to moderate. Although we did not expect that the bias measurements 
would completely overlap given that they are assumed to gauge different processes, 
the various processes are thought to be linked, which is why they should have shown 
some relationship. Several other studies also did not find consistent correlations 
for the cognitive biases they assessed (Klein et al., 2012; Klein et al., 2014; Watts 
& Weems, 2006). But how to explain these inconsistent findings then? The first 
explanation is that many studies gauged cognitive biases in subclinically anxious 
children whose threat-related schemas may not have been as strongly developed as 
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they are in children diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. Accordingly, and depending 
on the task characteristics and testing environment, some tasks may have triggered 
threat-related cognitions but others neutral associations. It is therefore important 
that studies also assess biases in clinically anxious children and to personalize the 
tasks to trigger their threat-specific associations and biased cognitions. 
Another explanation for the inconsistency in our and other findings is the reliability of 
reaction-time based measures. Since attention spans vary widely and most children 
are easily distracted, these tasks are generally less reliable than direct measures 
(Huijding et al., 2010) and may decrease the strength of correlations. Also, relatively 
few child anxiety studies have investigated the validity and reliability of these tasks 
in children (Brown et al., 2014), while those that used indirect measures developed 
their own stimulus material and task specifications, making it difficult to compare 
outcomes. 
The samples we used in our research also merit some further discussion. In the 
studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3 we recruited primary-school children with 
differing levels of anxiety but all participants had subclinical symptoms, which 
prevents the results and conclusions from being generalized to clinical populations. 
However, it is all the more interesting that we already observed biased cognitive 
processing in subclinical children. The children that were included in Chapters 4 
and 5 all had a parent with a panic and/or a social anxiety disorder but the groups 
were not equal in size. This is explained by the fact that it was more difficult to 
find parents with social anxiety disorder to participate in the study, which might be 
attributable to the two main characteristics of their disorder, namely a fear of being 
the centre of attention and a fear of standing out. The difference in group size may 
have reduced the significance of the results for the social anxiety group. We clearly 
need more larger scale studies that compare child cognitive processing in relation 
to different parental anxiety disorders. Finally, since in all our studies we focused on 
children between the ages of 8 and 14, we do not know whether cognitive biases 
and their relationship to parental anxiety are also present in younger children nor 
whether symptoms are perpetuated when children grow up. 
The research described suffered from more general limitations that all research suffers 
from, i.e. lack of time, funding and other practical constraints. These restrictions 
precluded us from investigating other pathways by which parental anxiety can be 
transferred to their offspring. For instance, the studies in this dissertation do not 
inform about cognitive biases in relation to physiological aspects of anxiety, social 
environment, specific parental behaviours, cultural aspects or genetic influences. 
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Also, given that biased processing is consistently found in adults with an anxiety 
disorder and since the parents in our samples had a lifetime anxiety disorder, it would 
have been interesting to learn whether their anxiety still manifested in cognitive 
biases and threat/fear schemas and if these would coincide with the cognitive 
processing patterns of their children. Since there were only two studies that had 
investigated the relationship between parental anxiety and child biased cognitive 
processing prior to the start of our research project, our first priority was to find 
further evidence for the existence of this relationship. It is the challenge of future 
research to establish how parental anxiety exactly influences threat associations and 
biased processing in their children.  Also, the current dissertation does not inform 
about the longitudinal course of child cognitive biases. Because such longitudinal 
studies measuring the predictive value of cognitive biases in the development 
of clinical anxiety were lacking, the research described in this dissertation was 
conducted within the larger framework of the SPRING project, which is aimed at 
the longitudinal relationships between parental anxiety and the development and 
maintenance of biased processing and anxiety in their offspring. 
Clinical Implications
Studies have shown that children of parents with an anxiety disorder have a 
significant higher risk of developing psychopathology themselves (Beidel & Turner, 
1997). Finding relationships between the threat associations and cognitive biases 
of subclinically anxious children with a clinically anxious parent, the studies in this 
dissertation provide a starting point for the prevention of anxiety disorders in this 
at-risk group. First and foremost, our findings underscore the importance of treating 
(young) adults with an anxiety disorder as early as possible, preferably before they 
have children. It is also recommended to educate parents and parents-to-be with 
a past or current anxiety disorder about how their behaviour can trigger or reduce 
anxiety in their child. Furthermore, even when they do not (yet) have clinically 
elevated levels of anxiety, it is important to change threat/fear-related cognitions 
in this at-risk group since biased childhood cognitive processing can become an 
anxiety-maintaining or anxiety-exacerbating factor. Here, preventive interventions 
based on the relatively new method of Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM) may 
be prescribed, where CBM aims at changing the child’s more automatic negative 
associations and biases with computerized tasks. Changing these biases at an early 
stage may prevent the child’s anxiety from developing into a disorder. 
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Conclusions
The research presented in this dissertation has provided insight into various aspects 
of cognitive processing in childhood anxiety. In addition to finding evidence of 
threat-related associations and biases in subclinically anxious children, we were the 
first to investigate and find a relationship between parental anxiety and several 
child cognitive biases, supporting theories on threat-related cognitive processing 
(Daleiden & Vasey, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). Assessing 
children of parents with a panic disorder and/or a social anxiety disorder, we found 
that they showed panic-related associations that coincided with their parent’s 
current panic levels. These children also showed more negative interpretation biases 
compared to the children with parents without an anxiety disorder, which finding was 
surprising since the children’s self-reported anxiety levels did not differ. Our findings 
accordingly demonstrate that in children of parents with a current history of anxiety 
disorders threat-related associations and interpretation biases together constitute 
a vulnerability factor, underscoring that direct and indirect measures supplement 
each other and facilitate the prediction of (persistent) anxiety and anxiety-related 
processing in this at-risk group. 
Based on these new insights, we were able to integrate and modify existing models 
of cognitive processing in childhood anxiety (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Daleiden & Vasey, 
1997; Klein, 2016; Muris & Field, 2008). The extended model highlights the role of 
child threat-related associations and schemas while incorporating the interaction 
between parental anxiety and biased cognitive processing in the child. The model 
can be used to conceptualize other ways in which threat associations and cognitive 
biases are transmitted. If we can disentangle the complex interactions at play in the 
intergenerational transmission of anxiety even further, this will enable us to formulate 
new directions for the prevention and early treatment of childhood anxiety. 
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Elk kind ervaart angsten. Gelukkig zijn de meeste van deze angsten kortdurend 
en passend bij de ontwikkeling van een kind. Echter, de laatste twintig jaar wijzen 
steeds meer onderzoeken uit dat een substantieel deel van de kinderen (2-27%) 
zulke sterke en langdurige angsten ervaart dat ze voldoen aan de criteria van een 
angststoornis (Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, & Angold, 2003). Angststoornissen 
zijn zelfs een van de meest voorkomende psychologische stoornissen bij kinderen, 
waarbij er een groot risico bestaat dat deze stoornissen aanwezig blijven tot in 
de volwassenheid wanneer kinderen geen behandeling krijgen (Biederman et al., 
2005; Roza, Hofstra, van der Ende, & Verhulst, 2003). Kinderen die een of meer 
ouders hebben met een angststoornis, zijn nog kwetsbaarder voor het ontwikkelen 
voor een angststoornis. Daarom is het van belang dat er meer onderzoek gedaan 
wordt naar de mechanismen die betrokken zijn bij de overdracht van angst binnen 
families. 
Er zijn meerdere factoren die meespelen bij de overdracht van angst. Een daarvan 
is een verstoorde cognitieve informatieverwerking (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, 
& Mathews, 1997). Er zijn aanwijzingen dat zowel kinderen als volwassenen met 
een angststoornis vertekeningen hebben in hun cognitieve informatieverwerking, 
waardoor ze meer gevaar waarnemen dan er werkelijk is. Er zijn vertekeningen 
gevonden in interpretatie, aandacht, geheugen en associaties. Dat betekent 
dat bij angstige kinderen ook neutrale of ambigue situaties met angst en gevaar 
geassocieerd zijn. Ook zijn kinderen met een angststoornis geneigd situaties 
negatiever te interpreteren en te onthouden en hebben ze meer aandacht voor 
zaken die mogelijk met hun angst te maken hebben. Zo zal een kind dat sociaal 
angstig is een glimlach sneller interpreteren als uitlachen en in een sociale situatie 
eerder tekenen van afwijzing opmerken en dit ook zo onthouden. 
Sommige van deze informatieverwerkingsprocessen gaan meer automatisch en 
andere processen zijn sneller op te merken en te sturen of te controleren (Beck & 
Clark, 1997). Daarom wordt in de literatuur ook wel onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
automatische en gecontroleerde cognitieve processen, al is dat onderscheid niet heel 
scherp te maken omdat de meeste informatieverwerkingsprocessen (bijvoorbeeld 
interpretatie) zowel automatische als gecontroleerde aspecten hebben. Volgens 
cognitieve theorieën worden de vertekeningen in informatieverwerking en de 
automatische en gecontroleerde processen gestuurd door cognitieve schema’s. Dit 
zijn samenhangende verzamelingen van associaties die leerervaringen, gedachten, 
gevoelens en emoties bevatten. Wanneer een kind voornamelijk gezonde schema’s 
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tot zijn beschikking heeft, helpen schema’s op een nuttige manier om situaties 
te kunnen plaatsen als iets positiefs of iets negatiefs. Echter, als een kind sterk 
negatieve leerervaringen heeft opgedaan en op een vertekende manier informatie 
verwerkt, kunnen de schema’s te negatief gekleurd worden. In het geval van mensen 
met angstproblematiek zijn bepaalde schema’s te sterk geassocieerd geraakt met 
gevaar, waardoor ook neutrale of positieve stimuli als gevaarlijk gezien worden. 
Zowel de meer automatische processen (aandacht) als de meer gecontroleerde 
processen (interpretatie en herinneren) zullen overmatig gefocust zijn op gevaar, 
wat het gevoel van angst weer versterkt. 
Hoewel cognitieve vertekeningen een rol kunnen spelen in de ontwikkeling 
en instandhouding van angstproblematiek bij kinderen, zijn er nog maar weinig 
onderzoeken gedaan naar de rol van deze vertekeningen en de relatie tussen 
deze vertekeningen en gedrag. Ook weten we niet of deze vertekeningen meer 
voorkomen bij kinderen van ouders met een angststoornis. Tevens is nog niet 
bekend of kinderen cognitieve vertekeningen hebben over hetzelfde onderwerp 
als de angststoornis van hun ouders (bijvoorbeeld een negatieve vertekening 
voor sociale situaties bij een ouder die sociale angst heeft), of dat het een meer 
algemene negatieve informatieverwerkingsstijl is. Het doel van dit proefschrift was 
dan ook om vertekende informatieverwerking bij kinderen te onderzoeken, ook in 
het perspectief van intergenerationele overdracht van angst. 
Samenhang tussen vertekende cognitieve informatieverwerking, angst en 
gedrag 
Het eerste onderzoeksdoel was om zowel automatische als meer gecontroleerde 
mechanismen van vertekende informatieverwerking bij kinderen te verkennen 
en vast te stellen wat de voorspellende waarde is van deze vertekeningen met 
betrekking tot de angst die kinderen ervaren en hun angst-gerelateerde gedrag. 
De studies in hoofdstukken 2 en 3 zijn gericht op het beantwoorden van dit 
onderzoeksdoel. Het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 2 focust op de negatieve gedachten 
van kinderen over hun eigen sociale prestatie en hun anticipatie van een negatieve 
reactie van anderen. Dit is onderzocht door 141 kinderen die varieerden in 
niveaus van sociale angst een presentatie van twee minuten te laten geven over 
een zelfgekozen onderwerp. Met vragenlijsten werd het algemene niveau van 
sociale angst en de angst voor en na de presentatie vastgesteld. Daarnaast werd 
uitgevraagd of kinderen negatieve gedachten hadden over hun prestatie en over 
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de reactie van anderen. Ook werden de sociale vaardigheden van de kinderen 
gescoord door onafhankelijke beoordelaars. Het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 3 focust 
op de samenhang tussen angst-gerelateerde associaties, aandachts-, interpretatie-, 
en geheugenvertekeningen en angst-gerelateerd gedrag in 95 kinderen die 
varieerden in niveaus van spinnenangst. Om deze vertekeningen te meten is 
gebruik gemaakt van een Affective Priming Task die angst-gerelateerde associaties 
meet, een Emotionele Stroop Task die aandachtsvertekeningen meet en een vrije 
herinner-taak na de Emotionele Stroop Task als meting van geheugenvertekening. 
Angst-gerelateerd gedrag werd gemeten door kinderen een bak met een vogelspin 
te laten naderen, waarbij interpretatievertekeningen gemeten werden door de 
kinderen de start-afstand tot de bak met de spin en de grootte van de spin te laten 
inschatten. 
Deze onderzoeken laten zien dat, zelfs als er geen echt gevaar is, kinderen toch de 
situatie zo kunnen verwerken alsof er iets gevaarlijks staat te gebeuren of is gebeurd. 
We vonden dat de meer gecontroleerde processen (gedachten en evaluaties) 
deels de angstniveaus van kinderen kunnen voorspellen in een sociale situatie. 
Gedachten over sociale afwijzing bleken samen te hangen met de angstniveaus 
van kinderen na een presentatie-opdracht. Deze negatieve gedachten zijn ook 
gerelateerd aan negatieve oordelen die kinderen gaven over hun eigen prestatie, 
maar niet aan hun werkelijke prestatie. Angstige kinderen leken niet minder goed te 
presenteren dan niet-angstige kinderen. Daarnaast vonden we dat kinderen angst-
gerelateerde associaties en vertekeningen in aandacht en interpretaties (maar geen 
vertekeningen in geheugen) vertoonden die samenhingen met het type angst, het 
niveau van hun angst en hun angstgedrag. Inhoudsspecificiteit werd gevonden 
voor sociale angst, paniek en spinnenangst. Hiermee wordt bedoeld dat kinderen 
die verhoogde niveaus van bijvoorbeeld sociale angst hebben, ook vertekende 
informatieverwerking laten zien rondom sociale stimuli. Ook werd duidelijk dat de 
bevindingen het beste passen in een model waarbij automatische en gecontroleerde 
processen als deels overlappend en niet als strikt gescheiden worden beschouwd. 
De rol van cognitieve vertekeningen in de intergenerationele overdracht van 
angst 
Het tweede onderzoeksdoel was om de aanwezigheid van cognitieve vertekeningen 
bij kinderen van ouders met een paniekstoornis en/of sociale angststoornis te 
onderzoeken. Om dit doel te bereiken zijn we het SPRING-project gestart, een 
longitudinaal project dat de impact van vertekende informatieverwerkingsprocessen 
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onderzoekt op toekomstige angststoornisontwikkeling van kinderen. In hoofdstuk 
4 en 5 worden twee cross-sectionele studies uit dit project beschreven, waarin de 
relatie tussen inhoudsspecificiteit van de cognitieve vertekeningen van het kind 
en de stoornis van de ouder centraal staat. Aan het SPRING-onderzoek namen 44 
kinderen van ouders met een paniekstoornis deel, 27 kinderen van ouders met 
een sociale angststoornis, 84 kinderen van ouders zonder angststoornissen en 7 
kinderen met ouders die zowel een paniekstoornis als een sociale angststoornis 
hadden. Interpretatievertekeningen werden gemeten met een ambigue 
scenariotaak met en zonder priming (een video van een ouder die vertelt over 
angst); angst-gerelateerde associaties werden gemeten met een Affective Priming 
Task. Daarnaast werden vragenlijsten afgenomen over de angstniveaus van de 
kinderen. Met deze onderzoeken werd beoogd vast te stellen of vertekende 
informatieverwerkingsprocessen een kwetsbaarheidsfactor kunnen vormen voor 
kinderen wiens ouders last hebben van een angststoornis. 
De resultaten van deze onderzoeken lieten opvallende verbanden zien tussen de 
angststoornis van de ouder en de cognitieve vertekeningen van het kind. We vonden 
aanwijzingen dat de vertekende interpretaties van de kinderen inhoudsspecifiek 
samenhingen met de angst van de ouder; namelijk dat de kinderen van ouders 
met een paniekstoornis sterkere negatieve interpretaties lieten zien van situaties 
die met paniek en lichamelijke sensaties te maken hadden dan kinderen die ouders 
hadden met een sociale angststoornis of zonder angststoornis. Voor kinderen van 
ouders met een sociale angststoornis was dit verband minder duidelijk. Hoewel ze 
een algemeen negatieve interpretatie hadden voor sociale scenario's, scoorden ze 
lager dan de kinderen van ouders met een paniekstoornis op specifieke negatieve 
sociale interpretatie (meer specifieke sociale angst-gerelateerde interpretaties). 
Ook vonden we dat het niet nodig was de cognitieve schema’s van kinderen eerst 
te activeren door middel van priming; bovenstaande uitkomsten werden ook 
gevonden in scenario’s waarbij geen priming plaatsvond. 
De onderzoeken lieten geen verband zien tussen de diagnose van de ouder en 
angst-gerelateerde associaties van het kind. Hiervoor leek wel het huidige niveau van 
de angst van de ouder van belang en dus niet of de ouder ooit gedurende het leven 
van het kind een paniekstoornis heeft gehad.  Het niveau van zelf-gerapporteerde 
panieksymptomen van de ouder hing significant samen met de paniek-gerelateerde 
negatieve associaties van het kind. Deze link werd niet gevonden voor de sociale 
angst-gerelateerde negatieve associaties en de niveaus van sociale angst van de 
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ouder. 
Integratie van onderzoeksgegevens in een model voor angst bij kinderen
De bevindingen van de vier onderzoekshoofdstukken zijn geïntegreerd in een 
model voor (vertekende) informatieverwerking bij kinderen, gebaseerd op eerdere 
modellen van Daleiden en Vasey (1997), Muris en Field ( 2008) en Klein (2016). 
Hierbij is ook gekeken naar de rol van de angst van ouders. 
Figuur 1. Het aangepaste informatieverwerkingsmodel van angst bij kinderen, waarbij de rol van ouderlijke angst 
beschreven wordt bij het verwerken van angst-gerelateerde informatie. 
Volgens het model (figuur 1) hangt het af van de angst-gerelateerde schema’s 
van het kind of hij/zij een stimulus of situatie zal inschatten als gevaarlijk of niet. 
Alle kinderen zullen geleerd hebben dat sommige stimuli gevaarlijk zijn (zoals 
wilde dieren), maar voor veel ambigue stimuli zal dit oordeel afhangen van hun 
persoonlijke leergeschiedenis. Wanneer een ambigue situatie snel beoordeeld 
wordt als potentieel gevaarlijk, dan hangt het van de context af of de angst-
gerelateerde of de neutrale associaties geactiveerd worden. Context-gebonden 
factoren zijn bijvoorbeeld de aanwezigheid van ouders of een grote afstand tussen 
het kind en het gevaar. Wanneer angst-gerelateerde associaties geactiveerd 
worden, dan volgen vertekeningen in verschillende cognitieve processen, gericht 
op gevaar (Huijding et al., 2010). In figuur 1 worden de cognitieve vertekeningen 
weergegeven in het gemêleerde grijze gebied in volgorde van meer automatisch 
naar meer gecontroleerd. Wanneer een kind informatie verwerkt gebaseerd op 
angstgerichte cognitieve vertekeningen, dan zal het tot de conclusie komen dat de 
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ambigue stimulus werkelijk gevaarlijk is, wat de initiële angst en angst-gerelateerde 
schema’s zal versterken. 
Daarnaast is ook de rol van de ouders in het model geïntegreerd. De resultaten van 
dit proefschrift laten zien dat er een relatie is tussen de interpretatievertekeningen 
van het kind en de angst van de ouder en het kind. Het is mogelijk dat kinderen van 
ouders met een angststoornis hun angst-gerelateerde associaties verwerven via hun 
ouders. Ook al vertonen deze kinderen (nog) geen verhoogde niveaus van angst, ze 
vertonen al wel verhoogde angst-gerelateerde informatieverwerking. In het model 
worden een aantal wegen genoemd waardoor de angst kan worden overgedragen, 
gebaseerd op eerder onderzoek, zoals de eigen angstverwachtingen en angst-
gerelateerde schema’s van ouders en angst-gerelateerd gedrag. Daarnaast is er ook 
mogelijk een generieke genetische gevoeligheid voor angst (Shimada–Sugimoto, 
Otowa, & Hettema, 2015). Wel is het belangrijk mee te nemen dat de onderzoeken 
in het proefschrift alleen gericht zijn op ouders met een paniekstoornis en sociale 
angst, en dat er meer onderzoek nodig is omdat er voornamelijk duidelijke 
verbanden zijn gevonden tussen de informatieverwerkingsprocessen van kinderen 
en ouders met een paniekstoornis. Bij ouders met sociale angst is dit verband 
onduidelijker. Er is dus nog meer onderzoek nodig bij andere angststoornissen 
en naar mogelijke factoren die voor de overdracht van cognitieve vertekeningen 
kunnen zorgen. Dit model kan gebruikt worden als inspiratie om nieuwe wegen 
te onderzoeken hoe angst van ouders de informatieverwerking van kinderen van 
vertekenen, bijvoorbeeld door het vergelijken van ouderlijk gedrag dat een veilige 
of een gevaarlijke context kan creëren (Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera, 1996; Muris, 
Steerneman, Merckelbach, & Meesters, 1996) of door genetische invloeden te 
onderzoeken (Gregory & Eley, 2007) en te kijken naar de gevoeligheid voor het 
leren van angst-gerelateerde associaties (Craske, Hermans, & Vansteenwegen, 
2006). Ook is het van belang meer helderheid te krijgen over of een vertekende 
informatieverwerking zorgt voor een grotere kans op een angststoornis bij kinderen. 
Daar is het longitudinale vervolgonderzoek van SPRING op gericht.
Samengevat, gebaseerd op de resultaten gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift en 
eerdere bevindingen geeft het voorgestelde model een overzicht van mogelijke 
factoren die van belang zijn in de samenhang tussen de angstklachten van ouders 
146
en cognitieve processen die kunnen leiden tot de intergenerationele overdracht 
van de angst op kinderen. 
Klinische implicaties
Zoals eerder genoemd hebben kinderen van ouders met een angststoornis 
een verhoogd risico om zelf een angststoornis te ontwikkelen (Beidel & Turner, 
1997). Doordat er relaties zijn gevonden tussen angst-gerelateerde associaties 
en cognitieve vertekeningen in de subklinisch angstige kinderen van ouders met 
een angststoornis, zijn de studies in dit proefschrift een startpunt voor onderzoek 
naar preventie van angststoornissen in deze risicogroep. Ten eerste bewijzen 
deze onderzoeken dat er een groot belang is in het vroeg behandelen van (jong)
volwassenen met een angststoornissen, bij voorkeur voor ze zelf kinderen hebben 
en ze voor te lichten over hoe bepaalde angst-gerelateerde gedragingen kunnen 
samenhangen met de angst van hun (toekomstige) kinderen. Daarnaast is het van 
belang om de angst-gerelateerde vertekende informatieverwerking en cognities 
van kinderen (van angstige ouders) te meten en te veranderen, ook al voldoen 
ze nog niet aan een klinisch niveau van angst, omdat deze processen angsten 
kunnen onderhouden en mogelijk zelfs versterken. Hiervoor zijn mogelijkheden 
ontstaan door een relatief nieuwe methode: Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM), 
die gericht is op het veranderen van de meer automatische negatieve associaties 
en vertekeningen van kinderen door middel van computertaken. Het veranderen 
van deze vertekeningen in een vroeg stadium zou mogelijk kunnen voorkomen dat 
angst uitgroeit tot een angststoornis.  
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